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I. INTRODUCTION

Suppose you own a company and you decide to terminate an employee.
Other employees have unsuccessfully sued your company for federal
employment discrimination, and you want to avoid another discrimination
lawsuit and its legal costs. So you offer a generous severance package to
this employee, provided that he signs a severance agreement which
contains a waiver of all legal claims related to his employment with (or
termination from) your company. Both the agreement and waiver are
crystal-clear.
You do not require the employee to sign the agreement "on the spot."
Instead, you afford him a twenty-one day period in which to review the
agreement. In addition, the agreement advises the employee to consult
with legal counsel before he signs it, but he chooses not to consult an
attorney regarding the agreement or its waiver of employment claims. The
employee then signs the agreement on the last day of the review period
and returns it to you. Per the agreement, your company then pays all of the
severance compensation to the employee.
Now, suppose this employee immediately sues your company under
various federal employment law theories, such as employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII) or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).2 In
response to your company's waiver defense, could the employee
successfully argue that the waiver was not "knowing and voluntary"
because he (1) did not actually consult with an attorney prior to signing the
severance agreement, (2) did not actually read or consider the agreement,
and (3) lacked sufficient business experience, sophistication, and
education?
Nine federal circuits-the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh-now use a "totality of circumstances" test
(totality test) to determine if a waiver of most federal employment claims
was "knowing and voluntary."3 This test contains no per se requirements
for a knowing and voluntary waiver; instead, it includes six or more
factors (depending upon the circuit) that a court must weigh to make that

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). Title VII is the primary piece of federal
employment legislation. It prohibits discrimination based on a person's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
2. Id. §§ 12101-12300 (2000).
3. See infra Part II.C. Twenty years ago, the federal courts applied a pure contract-based
approach to make the knowing and voluntary determination. See infra Part II.B. This approach
focused on traditional contract principles and defenses, such as clarity or ambiguity of the contract
and whether duress, coercion, fraud, or mutual mistake existed in its execution. See infra Part II.B.
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determination.
Some of the totality test's factors are solely within the control of the
employer and do not depend upon, or vary with, the employee. These
"Employer-Controlled Factors" include the following: using clear,
understandable waiver language; providing valuable consideration to the
employee in exchange for the waiver; affording the employee adequate
time in which to review and consider the waiver; and advising the
employee to consult with an attorney prior to signing the waiver.6
In contrast, many of the test's factors-in some circuits, over
half---depend solely upon the employee and are outside of an employer's
control.7 These "Employee-Dependent Factors" include the following: the
employee's education, background, and business experience; whether the
employee actually consulted with an attorney before signing the waiver;
the role that an employee played in deciding the terms of the agreement;
whether the employee actually knew or should have known of his or her
employment rights at the time of signing the waiver; and whether8 the
employee actually read and considered the waiver before signing it.
Part Idof this Article discusses the genesis and evolution of the totality
test by reviewing the seminal cases in which nine of the federal circuits
adopted the test during only a seven year period.
Part II discusses the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990
(OWBPA),9 which in part enumerates the requirements that employers
must meet before an employee can knowingly and voluntarily waive a
federal age discrimination claim"0 under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).11 While the OWBPA technically deals
only with waivers of ADEA claims, it is important in any discussion of the
totality test because its waiver requirements were, in part, Congress's
response to the inadequacies of that test.
Part IV presents the totality test's two shortcomings: (1) its use of a
pool of waiver factors, rather than per se waiver requirements and (2) its
inclusion of Employee-Dependent Factors over which an employer has no
control. This Part also discusses the four problematic consequences that
result from these two features. First, the totality test penalizes good-faith

4. See infra Parts II.C, IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Parts lI.C, IV.A.
7. See infra Part l.C.
8. See infra Parts lI.C, IV.A.
9. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(codified in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 630
(2000)).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0 (2000).
11. Id. §§ 621-634. The ADEA prohibits age-based employment discrimination against
individuals who are at least forty years old. Id. §§ 623(a), 631(a).
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employers-such as your company in the above example-who have taken
the steps within their control to ensure a valid waiver because they are
nonetheless compelled to defend a waiver challenge that is based on
employee-dependent variables. Second, the test provides employees with
inadequate waiver protection from bad-faith employers because it fails to
impose any specific waiver-related requirements on those employers.
Third, the totality test perpetuates waiver-related litigation that clogs
judicial dockets because its Employee-Dependent Factors inject
uncertainty into the validity of almost every waiver. Fourth, the test leads
cost-conscious employers to reduce the amount of employee severance
benefits because those employers offset benefits by their anticipated legal
expenses in connection with waiver-related litigation. Part IV concludes
by explaining how the totality test is inconsistent with the Congressional
waiver philosophy of the OWBPA, which uses only employer-controlled
requirements.
Part V of this Article proposes and then defends a new test-the
Waiver Certainty Test-for determining whether a waiver of non-ADEA
federal employment claims is knowing and voluntary. This new test
imposes four employer-controlled requirements for a valid waiver: (1) it
must contain clear, unambiguous waiver language; (2) it must be
supported by valid consideration; (3) the employer must afford the
employee up to twenty-one days to review the waiver before signature;
and (4) the employer must advise the employee in writing to consult with
legal counsel before signing the waiver. Part V explains how the Waiver
Certainty Test fixes the totality test's two shortcomings, dovetails with the
Congressional waiver approach embodied in the OWBPA, and avoids the
totality test's four problematic consequences.
11. THE EVOLUTION OF THE TOTALITY TEST IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCurrs

Prior to 1988, no federal circuit used the totality test to determine if a
waiver of federal employment claims was knowing and voluntary. 2
Beginning with the Third Circuit in 1988 and ending with the First Circuit
in 1995, nine federal circuits adopted the totality test. 3 Two circuits-the
Fourth and Eighth-have not adopted this test and still adhere to a pure
contract-based approach when making the knowing and voluntary
determination.' 4

12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part II.C. The D.C. Circuit has not ruled on whether the totality test or a pure
contract-based approach should be used to make this determination. As a result, the D.C. Circuit
is excluded from the circuit split comparison and discussion. See infra Part I.C.
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A. The Supreme Court's Alexander Decision-The Knowing
and Voluntary Standardfor Waivers of FederalEmployment Claims
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court decidedAlexanderv. Gardner-Denver
Co.15 and specified that a waiver of claims under Title VII must meet a
knowing and voluntary standard.16 Alexander did not involve an employee
who had signed a waiver in exchange for severance pay and then
challenged the validity of the waiver. Instead, the issue before the Court
was whether an employee who submits a Title VII race discrimination
claim to final arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement's
grievance procedure retains the right to a de novo trial in federal court
under Title VI. 7
However, the waiver issue became relevant when Gardner-Denver
argued that Alexander had "waived" his Title VII claim by resorting to that
grievance procedure and arbitration forum.1 8 This argument afforded the
Court the opportunity to discuss when an employee can waive his or her
Title VII claim. Rejecting Gardner-Denver's waiver argument, the Court
concluded that "[a]lthough presumably an employee may waive his cause
of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement, mere resort to
the arbitral forum to enforce contractual rights constitutes no such
waiver. , ,

9

.

Then, in a footnote, the Court set forth the knowing and voluntary
standard for a valid waiver of a Title VII claim:
[P]etitioner and respondent did not enter into a voluntary
settlement expressly conditioned on a waiver of petitioner's
cause of action under Title VII. In determining the
effectiveness of any such waiver, a court would have to
determine at the outset that the employee's consent to the
settlement was voluntary and knowing. In no event can the
submission to arbitration of a claim under the
nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining
with respect to an
agreement constitute a binding waiver
20
employee's rights under Title VII.
1:5. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
16. Id.at 52 n.15.
17. Id. at 38. The Court ruled that an employee who seeks relief before an arbitrator (pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure) is not precluded from also pursuing
a Title VII discrimination lawsuit in district court. Id. at 47-48, 59-60. Reasoning that an
employee's contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement are "distinctly separate"
from independent Title VH statutory rights, id. at 49-50, 52, the Court found the election of
remedies doctrine inapplicable. Id. at 49.
18. Id. at 52.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 52 n.15 (emphasis added). Although Alexander applied the "voluntary and

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/2
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While setting forth the "voluntary and knowing" standard for a valid
waiver, the Court did not provide-nor has it since provided-any test or
approach for determining whether a waiver meets that standard.2 ' Over the
next twenty years, the circuits filled this void with either the totality test
or a pure contract-based approach.
B. Post-Alexander and Pre-1988-The Use of a Pure
Contract-BasedApproach
Between the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Alexander and 1988,
only a limited number of circuits were asked to determine whether an
employee's waiver of federal employment claims met the knowing and
voluntary standard.22 The circuits confronting the issue tended to use a
pure contract-based approach that analyzed the waiver as a simple
contract.
For example, in the 1983 Eighth Circuit case of Pilon v. University of
Minnesota,23 the university had settled a sex and age discrimination
lawsuit brought by Pilon, a graduate student.24 Pilon had alleged that she
was discriminatorily denied a Ph.D.25 The settlement involved a payment
to Pilon in exchange for a general waiver of claims.26 Two months after
signing the waiver, Pilon claimed that she had been denied faculty
positions based on her sex and then attempted to collect under a consent
decree that had been entered against the university in a separate Title VU
sex discrimination lawsuit.27 The district court granted the university's
motion for summary judgment based on Pilon's signed waiver.28
Affirming the district court, the Eighth Circuit initially looked to
contractual clarity and concluded that "the release is worded to clearly and
unambiguously release all of Pilon' s claims against the university., 29 The

knowing" standard to a Title VII waiver, the Court had previously applied this general requirement
to other types of waivers as well. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957)
(discussing waiver of the double jeopardy defense and noting that "[i]n any normal
sense .... [waiver] connotes some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right"); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (discussing waiver of the right to counsel and noting that "[a]
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege").
21. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52.
22. See infra Part II.C (explaining why more circuits began to address the knowing and
voluntary waiver issue in the mid-to-late 1980s).
23. 710 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1983).
24. Id. at 466-67.
25. Id. at 467.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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court then addressed Pilon's claim that she did not "knowingly and
voluntarily" waive her Title VH claims because she had intended to
exclude those claims from the waiver (and supposedly requested her
attorney to do so).3°
Rejecting Pilon's argument, the Eighth Circuit relied on contract-based
principles, noting that "[i]f fraud or duress were claimed, Pilon would of
course be entitled to show by evidence that she had not voluntarily signed
the release, however clear and unambiguous its language . *..."" In
addition, the court "decline[d] to adopt the rule asserted by Pilon that even
where a waiver of Title VII rights is unambiguous, a court must inquire
into the voluntariness of the employee's consent."32
Three years after the Eighth Circuit's Pilon decision, the Sixth Circuit
similarly decided Runyan v. NationalCashRegister Corp.33 National Cash
Register (NCR) notified Runyan-its fifty-nine-year-old in-house
attorney-that it was terminating him for poor performance. 34 Runyan
immediately claimed that his termination was the result of age
discrimination.35 The parties then negotiated an exit consulting agreement,
and NCR later amended the agreement to provide higher consultant pay to
Runyan in exchange for a full waiver of legal claims. 36 Runyan signed the
waiver and worked the seven-month term of his consultant agreement.37
Within six months after the consulting term expired, Runyan filed an
ADEA age discrimination lawsuit against NCR.3" The district court
granted summary judgment to NCR on the grounds that Runyan
knowingly and voluntarily waived his ADEA claims.3 9
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.' The court stated that "[in
determining whether [Runyan] knowingly and voluntarily waived his
ADEA claims, we apply ordinary contract principles."' The court then

30. Id.
31. Id. at 468.
32. Id.
33. 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir. 1986).
34. Id. at 1040.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1040-41.
38. ld. at 1041.
39. Id. at 1040.
40. Id. at 1045. Initially, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of whether an ADEA
waiver-like a waiver of minimum wage and overtime claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000)-required government supervision (by the EEOC
or a court) in order to be valid. Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1041-42. The court concluded that
unsupervised ADEA waivers were permissible. Id. at 1043-44 (reasoning that the FLSA and the
ADEA covered different segments of workers).
41. Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044 n.10. The Sixth Circuit stated that these contract principles
should apply "'where overreaching or exploitation is not inherent in the situation."' Id. at 1045
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/2
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concluded that there was no "overreaching" or "exploitation" in Runyan's
situation, as he was an experienced employment law attorney who had
taken the benefit of the bargain despite his belief at the time that his
ADEA waiver was invalid.42
As Pilon and Runyan illustrate, the circuits that addressed the issue of
waiver validity prior to 1988 focused on traditional contract principles,
such as language clarity, adequate consideration, the absence of fraud or
duress, and unconscionability or overreaching.
C. 1988 and Beyond: A Circuit-By-CircuitAnalysis of the
Evolution of the Totality Test
Almost fifteen years after Alexander, the totality test started its rise
among the circuit courts. While the knowing and voluntary waiver issue
had not been prevalent among the circuits before 1988, another legal issue
surfaced in the mid-to-late 1980s that led more circuits to confront it.
That issue du jour was whether an employee's waiver of ADEA age
discrimination claims required government supervision (by the EEOC or
a court) in order to be valid. As more plaintiffs began to argue that their
ADEA waivers were invalid because they lacked government supervision,
more circuits began to address federal employment waiver cases,
especially those in the ADEA context. Because these circuits concluded

(quoting D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 122 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
One could view this language as implying that the Sixth Circuit potentially favored a different
approach-perhaps a totality-type test-where overreaching or exploitation is inherent in the
situation. Runyan itself did not answer that question, because the court neither described the
circumstances that would constitute "inherent" overreaching or exploitation nor explained whether
the pure contract-based approach would still apply if there was "inherent" overreaching or
exploitation. See generally id. Regardless, the Sixth Circuit continued to apply the pure contractbased approach in other federal employment waiver cases until 1995. See infra note 138 (discussing
other Sixth Circuit decisions that applied the pure contract-based approach). In 1995, the Sixth
Circuit switched to the totality test. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
42. Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044-45.
43. For other examples of pre-1988 circuit decisions applying the pure contract-based
approach to federal employment waivers, see Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539,
541 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that ADEA waivers do not require government supervision and finding
that plaintiff's ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary under "'ordinary contract principles,"'
because the waiver used "clear and simple language" and there was "no showing [that the
employer] was guilty of exploitation or overreaching" (quoting Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044 n.10));
Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that ADEA waivers
are permissible "in the absence of fraud, deceit, or unconscionable overreaching"); Rogers v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that the plaintiff's Title VII waiver was
knowing and voluntary, because the release "clearly and unambiguously" waived all claims, she
was not "forced" to sign the release, and "no evidence was introduced indicating fraud or undue
influence").
Published
by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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that government supervision of ADEA waivers was not necessary, 44 they
then had to address the circumstances under which an employee's waiver
was knowing and voluntary.
A discussion of the seminal cases in which nine of the circuits adopted
the totality test is helpful in understanding the rationale for each circuit's
choice and the important role played by the test's Employee-Dependent
Factors.
1. 1988: The Third Circuit Adopts the Totality Test
The Third Circuit was the first to adopt the totality test for determining
whether an employee knowingly and voluntarily waived federal
employment claims. In Coventry v. United States Steel Corp.,45 United
States Steel (USS) terminated Hallas-a foreman who had worked for
USS in excess of thirty-five years. 6 Less than three months earlier, Hallas
had filed an age discrimination claim against USS with the EEOC and
alleged that he had been previously laid off due to his age.47
At the time of Hallas's termination, USS notified him that he could
qualify for certain severance pay (labeled a "pension benefit") if he signed
a form that waived ADEA (and Title VI) claims and all other state and
federal employment-related causes of action.4" USS did not require Hallas
to sign the waiver form within any set time period; instead, it notified him
to meet with the personnel department to discuss his separation-related
options.4 9
At this meeting, USS again advised Hallas that he would receive the
pension benefit only if he signed the waiver form.5" Hallas refused,
51
because (as he later testified) he had doubts about the form's legality.
USS met again with Hallas a week later, and he again refused to sign the

44. The Sixth Circuit in Runyan was the first circuit to address (and reject) the argument that
an ADEA waiver required government supervision. See supranote 40. After Runyan, several other
circuits also rejected this argument. See supra note 43 (the Eighth Circuit); infra note 56 and
accompanying text (the Third Circuit); infra note 69 and accompanying text (the Second Circuit);
infra note 85 and accompanying text (the Fifth Circuit); infra note 109 and accompanying text (the
Fourth Circuit); infra note 118 and accompanying text (the Eleventh Circuit); infra note 160 and
accompanying text (generally discussing the circuits' rejection of this argument).
45. 856 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1988).
46. Id.at 515-16. The named plaintiff, James Coventry, had originally filed an ADEA age
discrimination class action lawsuit against USS; Hallas later elected to join the class action. Id. at
515 & n.1.
47. Id.at 516.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/2
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waiver form.5 2 Ten days after this second meeting, Hallas returned to USS
and signed the waiver form-approximately one month after he had
initially received the form for his review.53 Within seven months after
signing the waiver, Hallasjoined an ADEA class action against USS.14 The
district court ruled that Hallas's ADEA claim was barred because he had
knowingly and voluntarily signed the waiver.55
On appeal, the Third Circuit addressed whether Hallas' s waiver of his
ADEA claims met Alexander's knowing and voluntary standard.5 6 It
observed that other circuits had relied upon "general principles of contract
construction"-such as contract clarity and the presence or absence of
fraud or undue influence-to make the knowing and voluntary
determination.57
However, the Third Circuit rejected this pure contract-based approach
in favor of a totality of circumstances test:
We agree that this evaluation [of contract principles] is
necessary and useful, but in our view, the inquiry into the
validity of a release of discrimination claims does not end
with the evaluation that would be applied to determine the
validity of a contract .... [A] review of the totality of the

circumstances, considerate of the particularindividual who
has executed the release, is also necessary.

Therefore, we adopt the view that in the determination of
whether a waiver was signed knowingly and voluntarily,
review of the totalit of the circumstances in which it was
signed must be had.
The court reasoned that the totality test's tighter scrutiny of ADEA
waivers was preferable to a "necessary and useful," but not sufficient, pure
contract-based approach because the former furthered the "strong policy

52. Id. at 516-17.
53. Id. at 517.
54. Id.
55. Id at 524.
56. Id. at 522, 524. The Third Circuit also rejected the view that an ADEA waiver required
government supervision in order to be valid. Id. at 517, 521 n.8 (finding that "there has been
general consensus that the private settlement of [ADEA] claims is not inconsistent with the
ADEA").
57. See id. at 522.
58. Id. at 522-24 (emphasis added); see also id. at 518, 522 (requiring close evaluation of
various factors that are indicia of a knowing and voluntary waiver).
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concerns to eradicate discrimination in employment."59
The Third Circuit then enumerated six factors that comprised this
"[c]areful evaluation of the release form itself, and of the complete
circumstances in which it was executed":
(1) the employee's education and business experience;
(2) the amount of time the employee had, or had access to, the
waiver before signature;
(3) the role of the employee in deciding the terms of the
severance agreement;
(4) the clarity of the waiver;
(5) whether the employee actually consulted with, or was
represented by, legal counsel; and
(6) whether the employee received consideration for the
waiver that exceeded any benefits to which he or she was
already entitled.'
59. Id. at 522-23. The Third Circuit suggested that the differences between the totality test
and the pure contract-based approach were minimal, because courts applying the latter-such as
the Sixth Circuit in Runyan-actually considered totality test-type factors in making their decisions.
Id. at 524 n.9. For example, the court stated that the Runyan court "considered other factors
[beyond traditional contract principles], among them the fact that the plaintiff himself was a
lawyer" who was knowledgeable in labor law. Id.
While courts may consider similar waiver-related facts under the two approaches, the
approaches themselves are different legal tests. First, the legal foundation of each approach is
distinct-the former uses only traditional contract principles, while the latter extends beyond those
principles by imposing additional factors for a court to consider. Second, as the Coventry court even
recognized, application of the pure contract-based approach and totality test to the same waiverrelated facts can, and often does, yield different results as to a waiver's validity. See id. at 522, 524
(noting that Hallas's waiver would be valid under traditional contract principles, but finding that
it was not knowing and voluntary under the totality test).
60. Id. at 523. The court borrowed these six factors from the New York district court case
EEOCv. AmericanExpress PublishingCorp., 681 F. Supp. 216,219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying
a six-factor test to determine whether the plaintiff's ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary and
finding that "several... factors ... raise sufficient question as to the voluntariness" of that waiver,
particularly that "[t]here [was] no indication that any of the release's terms were negotiated" and
that the plaintiff's attorney "was not present when plaintiff[] signed the agreement" and had
"advised... [the plaintiff] that the agreement was not binding"). As the sources for its six-factor
test, the district court cited Lancasterv. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir.
1987) and DiMartinov. City of Hartford,636 F. Supp. 1241, 1247 (D. Conn. 1986). Am. Express
Publ'g Corp., 681 F. Supp. at 219.
However, neither Lancaster nor DiMartinoused a six-factor totality test. In Lancaster, the
Eighth Circuit expressly applied an "ordinary contract principles" approach to determine if an
ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary. 809 F.2d at 541 (quoting Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register
Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 n. 10 (6th Cir. 1986)) (concluding that plaintiffs ADEA waiver was
knowing and voluntary, rather than the result of "exploitation or overreaching," because the waiver
was clear, no signature deadline had been imposed, and plaintiff was a management executive who
had negotiated parts of the waiver). In DiMartino,the Connecticut district court relied on only three
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Applying this totality test, the Third Circuit reversed the district court
and concluded that Hallas did not knowingly and voluntarily sign the
waiver. 6' Even though (1) "the release was written in clear, specific
language," (2) "Hallas was competent enough to read and understand its
literal meaning," (3) he was sophisticated enough to even "doubt[] the
legal adequacy of the form," and (4) he actually had the release a full
month before he signed it, the court said that was "not enough. '62 Instead,
the Third Circuit relied significantly on the lack of evidence showing that
"Hallas did in fact consult with an attorney" or had been encouraged to do
so by USS.6 3 The court then speculated regarding the effect that Hallas's
lack of legal counsel had on his waiver:
Because Hallas did not have guidance from an attorney, it is
at leastplausiblethat he believed that despite the language of
the release, he had preserved his right to challenge the
validity of the form ....
A meaningful comprehension of the
legal significance of a release of ADEA claims, as well as the
ability to understand the literal definitions of its terms, is
necessary to a "knowing" waiver. . . . [Tihe absence of
assistanceby an attorney makes the certaintythat Hallashad
that meaningful comprehension too doubtful for
64 us to
conclude that his waiver was knowingly executed.
The Coventry decision illustrates the important role that the totality
test's Employee-Dependent Factors (such as whether an employee actually
retains legal counsel and whether an employee's personal background
allows for a "meaningful comprehension" of a legal waiver) can play in

factors-whether the waiver agreement was in writing, whether it was clear or ambiguous, and
whether the employee was actually represented by an attorney--to make the knowing and voluntary
determination. 636 F. Supp. at 1247-48 (concluding that plaintiff's ADEA waiver was knowing and
voluntary because each of these three factors was satisfied).
61. Coventry, 856 F.2d at 524, 525.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 524-25.
64. Id. at 525 (emphasis added). Three months after Coventry, the Third Circuit decided
Cirillo v. Arco Chemical Co., 862 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1988), and expanded its six-factor Coventry
test by adding another Employee-Dependent Factor and another Employer-Controlled Factor: (1)
whether the employee knew or should have known his federal employment rights at the time of
waiver signature and (2) whether the employer encouraged the employee to seek legal counsel prior
to waiver signature. Id. at 451-52, 455. Holding that Cirillo's ADEA waiver was knowing and
voluntary, the Third Circuit focused on the following Employee-Dependent and EmployerControlled Factors: (1) the waiver language was clear; (2) Arco Chemical encouraged Cirillo to
consult with an attorney; (3) Cirillo was "a literate, well-educated man" who had the waiver
agreement one month before signing it; and (4) prior to signing the waiver, Cirillo had asserted age
discrimination claims against Arco Chemical and thus "had specific reason to believe he was in a
position to assert ... the ADEA claims he [then sought] to press." Id. at 452-55.
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evaluating that waiver's validity. 65 These factors led the Coventry court to
nullify Hallas' s waiver, notwithstanding the fact that USS had taken those
steps within its control to ensure that his waiver was knowing and
voluntary. 66
2. 1989: The Second and Ninth Circuits Adopt
the Totality Test
Within a year after Coventry, the Second and Ninth Circuits formally
adopted the totality test for making the knowing and voluntary
determination.67 In Bormann v. AT&T Communications,Inc.,68 the Second
Circuit aimed to "clarify the standard that should be used in deciding
whether an employee signed a release [of ADEA claims] knowingly,
willfully, and free from coercion."'69 After noting that the Sixth and Eighth
Circuits applied an "'ordinary contract principles"' 7 approach while the
Third Circuit used a "more stringent" totality of circumstances test, the
court followed the Third Circuit and adopted the totality test. 71 Borrowing
from Coventry, the Second Circuit viewed the totality test to be more
"consistent with the strong congressional purpose underlying the ADEA
to eradicate discrimination in employment."72 The court also stressed the
"need to examine carefully any situation in which an older worker
bargains away the statutory right to be free from age discrimination."73
The Second Circuit varied its totality test by "add[ing]" another
consideration to the Coventry factors: whether the employer encourages
(or discourages) an employee to consult with legal counsel.74 Applying the
totality test's careful examination, the court concluded that the twelve

65. Coventry, 856 F.2d at 525.
66. Id.
67. Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458,462 (9th Cir. 1989); Bormann v. AT&T
Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989).
68. 875 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 403. The Second Circuit also joined the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits by
concluding that an ADEA waiver did not require government supervision in order to be valid. Id.
at 401-02.
70. Id. at 403 (quoting Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 n. 10 (6th
Cir. 1986) and citing Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1987)).
Despite citing the Sixth Circuit's Runyan decision, the Bormann court had referred inadvertently
to the Sixth Circuit as the Fifth Circuit in the opinion's text. Id.
71. Id. (citing Coventry, 856 F.2d at 524).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Bormann court also considered whether the employee had a "fair opportunity"
actually to consult with legal counsel prior to waiver signature. See id. However, this additional
consideration is the functional equivalent of the second Coventry factor (the amount of time that
the employee had the waiver before signing it).
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plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily signed their respective waivers.75 In
reaching that conclusion, the court relied on the following EmployeeDependent and Employer-Controlled Factors: (1) the plaintiffs were
second-level managers who were "experienced" in contracts; (2) the
waivers were clear and unambiguous; (3) the waivers advised the plaintiffs
that they "may wish to consult [their] attorney[s]";and (4) the plaintiffs
had the waivers for two to three months before signing them.7 6
Three months after the Bormann decision, the Ninth Circuit decided
Stroman v. West Coast Grocery Co. 77 Unlike Bormann and
Coventry-both ADEA cases-Stroman was a Title VII case and marked
the first time that a circuit court applied the totality test outside of the
ADEA context.78 While not mentioning those circuits applying the pure
contract-based approach, the Stroman court cited Coventry and stated that
the determination of whether Stroman's waiver was "'voluntary,
deliberate, and informed"' rested on an evaluation of various "'indicia.'79
The Ninth Circuit viewed four totality test factors as being of "primary
importance": (1) the employee's education and business experience (the
first Coventry factor); (2) the presence of "a noncoercive atmosphere" for
waiver signature (or, the time that the employer provided the employee to
review the agreement before signing it (the second Coventry factor)); (3)
the waiver's clarity and non-ambiguity (the fourth Coventry factor); and
(4) whether the employee consulted with an attorney before signing the
waiver (the fifth Coventry factor).8 °
Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Stroman's
waiver was knowing and voluntary.8 ' Specifically, the court relied on the
following Employee-Dependent and Employer-Controlled Factors: (1)
Stroman had received "training in the Army and [had a] business
management-related community college degree" and thus "possessed the
education and skills necessary to understand that.., he waived all legal
claims"; (2) Stroman was not coerced into signing the agreement
immediately but had it "several days" before signing it; and (3)
Stroman-who did not retain a lawyer to review the agreement-was
neither discouraged nor precluded from having legal counsel do so before

75. See id.
76. Id. at 401, 403 (emphasis in original).
77. 884 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1989).
78. See id. at 461,462.
79. Id. at 462 (quoting Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514,522 (3d Cir. 1988)). Other
than citing to Coventry and to prior Ninth Circuit precedent that had used an "all the circumstances"
approach to evaluate waivers in other contexts, the Ninth Circuit did not expand on its reasons for
adopting the totality test for federal employment waivers. See id.
80. Id.
81. Seeid. at462-63.
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he signed it. 2
3. 1990: The Fifth and Tenth Circuits Adopt the Totality
Test and Congress Passes the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA)
With three federal circuits having adopted the totality test in a two-year
period, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits would follow suit in 1990. In addition,
Congress entered the fray in October 1990 by enacting the OWBPA,
which set forth per se requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of
age discrimination claims under the ADEA."3
In its April 1990 decision in O'Hare v. Global Natural Resources,
Inc.," the Fifth Circuit adopted "a totality of the circumstances approach"
for determining "what constitutes a knowing and voluntary waiver under
the ADEA."85 Relying on Coventry and Bormann, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the totality test was "'consistent with the strong
congressional purpose underlying the ADEA to eradicate discrimination
in employment."' 86
For its totality test, the court used the six Coventry factors.8 7

Concluding that O'Hare's waiver was knowing and voluntary, the Fifth
Circuit significantly relied on the following Employee-Dependent and
Employer-Controlled Factors: (1) O'Hare was an attorney and had
business experience and training with contracts; (2) he had the agreement

82. Id.
83. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1998)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 630 (2000)); infra Part ll.
84. 898 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1990).
85. Id. at 1017. The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument that ADEA waivers required
government supervision, based on its prior decision in EEOC v. Cosmair,Inc., L'OrealHairCare
Division, 821 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that an ADEA waiver need not be
supervised in order to be enforceable), and made reference to the Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuit decisions that had also reached the same conclusion. See O'Hare, 898 F.2d at 1017.
86. Id. (quoting Bormann v. AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399,403 (2d Cir. 1989)). In
adopting the totality test, the Fifth Circuit did not cite or distinguish its 1986 decision in Rogers v.
GeneralElectric Co., 781 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986). In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit applied traditional
contract principles (rather than a totality-type test) to the plaintiff's Title VII waiver and concluded
that it was knowing and voluntary because the waiver language was clear, "no one forced [Rogers]
to sign the release," and there was no evidence "indicating fraud or undue influence." Id. at 456.
As part of its analysis under these traditional contract principles, the court also discussed the fact
that the plaintiff had been advised to consult with legal counsel and had been employed and
"educated" by General Electric to "read and analyze complex Department of Defense contracts."
Id. at 456 & n.8. While a court applying the totality test would also consider these types of facts,
the Rogers court nonetheless considered them within a pure contract-based approach. Id.; see also
supra note 59 (explaining that consideration of similar waiver-related facts under the two
approaches does not mean that they constitute the same legal test).
87. O'Hare,898 F.2d at 1017.
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for about one month before he signed it; and (3) he actually consulted with
three different attorneys prior to signature. 8
Three months after O'Hare,the Tenth Circuit decided Torrez v. Public

88. Id. at 1016-18. O'Hare had originally claimed that his ADEA waiver was invalid due to
duress rather than arguing that his waiver did not meet the knowing and voluntary standard. Id. at
1016. However, the Fifth Circuit opted to analyze the knowing and voluntary angle rather than the
Texas state law duress defense because it felt that "federal common law" was "the proper source
of law for determining the validity of [a] waiver" and that the "policies embedded in the federal
statute should not be frustrated by state law." Id. at 1017. Thus, the court appeared to view the
knowing and voluntary requirement as displacing the state law defense of duress. See id.
This Article does not dispute that a federally-created test should govern analysis of whether a
federal employment waiver is knowing and voluntary. Indeed, the Waiver Certainty Test proposed
in Part V is such a test because it includes two requirements-a twenty-one day review period and
a requirement that the employee be advised to consult with an attorney-that exceed the typical
state contract law requirements. See infra Part V.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit's view that the knowing and voluntary standard displaces state
law contract defenses is flawed for three reasons. First, while Alexander introduced an additional
knowing and voluntary standard for a Title VII waiver, the Supreme Court did not otherwise change
the landscape for evaluating those waivers by abrogating other state law requirements for a valid
contract (such as the absence of duress). See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52
& n.15 (1974).
Second, while one may argue that the state law duress analysis is not important because the
knowing and voluntary analysis will naturally invalidate any waiver signed under duress, that
argument confuses the issue. The issue is not whether the results of the analyses could be similar;
instead, it is whether one analysis was judicially intended to preempt another and whether the
analyses themselves-duress versus knowing and voluntary--are legally distinct. Just because two
analyses reach similar results does not mean that the analyses themselves are the same. If W+X= 10
and Y-Z= 10, the equations are different (as are the values of W, X, Y, and Z) even though their
results are the same.
Third, the preemptive view overlooks situations where a waiver is knowing and voluntary under
the totality test but might otherwise be invalid under state law duress theory. Suppose a company
terminates an employee who is college-educated and has substantial business experience with
contract negotiations, and the company offers to provide severance pay if the employee signs a
severance agreement with a full waiver of legal claims. The severance agreement is crystal-clear,
and it advises the employee to consult with an attorney prior to waiver signature, which the
employee does. In addition, the employee was able to negotiate additional severance pay, ample
consideration supports the agreement, and the company provides a full month to the employee to
review the agreement before signing it. The employee signs the agreement on the last day of the
review period and then receives his severance pay.
However, the company had some "inside information" before offering the employee the
severance package. Specifically, it learned that the employee had borrowed a large sum of money
from a loan shark, who told the employee that he (the loan shark) would seriously injure a member
of the employee's family if the money was not repaid within thirty days. The company had
purposefully used this situation as the leverage to obtain the employee's waiver of claims.
Under these facts, the employee's waiver meets all of the Coventry factors and is knowing and
voluntary under the totality test. However, the company's conduct and misuse of its knowledge
regarding the loan shark's threats could arguably form the basis of a distinct duress defense under
state law.
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Service Co. 89 In Torrez, the employer-Public Service Company of New
Mexico (PSC)-terminated Torrez as part of a workforce downsizing.9"
Torrez had worked for the company for almost nine years and was a
foreman in the power plant's maintenance department. 91
In its notification letter to Torrez, PSC indicated that he had thirty days
to decide between a "voluntary" or "involuntary" severance package.92
While both packages provided full salary for four months and employee
benefits for eight months, the voluntary package also permitted employees
with five or more years of service to vest early in retirement benefits
provided that they signed a waiver of legal claims.9 3 Torrez attended an
orientation meeting for all terminated employees.94
On the last day of his election period, Torrez chose the voluntary
package and signed the waiver that covered "any and all claims which [he
had] or might have [had], arising out of or related to [his] employment or
resignation or termination from employment." 9 Torrez then filed a Title
VII lawsuit against PSC in which he alleged race and national origin
discrimination. 96 Focusing on the clear and unambiguous waiver language,

the district court granted summary judgment to PSC on the grounds that
Torrez had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Title VII claims. 97
Vacating the summary judgment order and remanding the case for trial,
the Tenth Circuit felt that the district court's analysis of Torrez's waiver
did not go far enough. 98 While noting that some circuits "apply ordinary
contract principles and focus primarily on the clarity of language in the
release,"99 the court stated that the "majority of circuits.., explicitly look
beyond the contract language and consider all relevant factors in assessing
a plaintiff's knowledge and the voluntariness of the waiver.'"" The Tenth

89. 908 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1990).
90. Id. at 688.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 688, 690.
99. Id. at 689.
100. Id. The Tenth Circuit's claim that a majority of the circuits had adopted the totality test
was overstated. Only four circuits (the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth) had adopted the totality test
at the time of Torrez.
The Torrez court had also included the Seventh Circuit within its list of circuits applying the
totality test. Id. (citing Riley v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1989)). However,
in Riley, the Seventh Circuit declined to evaluate a Title VII waiver under the totality test, where
the "language of the waiver is unambiguous" and the plaintiff "is represented by counsel who
actively negotiates the release." Riley, 881 F.2d at 373, 374. Under those circumstances, the court
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Circuit stated that the totality test was "the better one" and that "[the
court's] inquiry cannot end" with the necessary, but insufficient,
evaluation of a contract's language. 1 Consistent with Coventry, the court
reasoned that the totality test was more "'considerate of the particular
individual who has executed the release"' and protected10"'the
strong policy
2
concerns to eradicate discrimination in employment.'
The Tenth Circuit varied the Coventry totality test by adding one
Employer-Controlled Factor and one Employee-Dependent Factor: (1)
whether an employer advises an employee to seek legal counsel and (2)
"whether [the employee] knew or should have known his rights upon
execution" of the waiver.10 3 Applying its totality test, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that there was "a material question of fact as to whether Torrez
knowingly and voluntarily signed the release.'" '
While conceding that the waiver was "clear and unambiguous," the
court refused to let this clarity "derail [its] analysis" 105 under the totality
test. Instead, the Tenth Circuit focused on the following EmployeeDependent Factors: (1) Torrez supposedly did not know he was waiving
possible discrimination claims when he signed the waiver, but instead

deemed it "unnecessary to create a distinct federal body of law to interpret plaintiff's release of
federal rights" and to "inquir[e] into the subjective intent of the waiving party" per the totality test.
Id.
Rather than applying any totality test, the Seventh Circuit focused on traditional contract
principles and concluded that an employee (like Riley) who signs a waiver under the referenced
circumstances "must be found to have executed the release or settlement voluntarily and
knowingly, unless vitiating circumstances such as fraud or duress existed to nullify [his or her]
assent to the settlement." Id. at 374 (finding that Riley's waiver was knowing and voluntary
because she "[did] not assert any fraudulent or coercive behavior").
In dicta, the court left the door open to the totality test, because it stated that a court "may need
to inquire beyond the state law requirements for a valid contract" in certain circumstances, such as
where a person "possesse[s] a limited education," "was not represented by counsel," or "was
otherwise unable to appreciate the consequences of the release." Id. The Seventh Circuit ultimately
adopted the totality test in 1995. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
101. Torrez, 908 F.2d at 690.
102. Id. (quoting Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522-23 (3d Cir. 1988)). As in
Coventry, the Torrez court minimized the differences between the totality test and the pure contractbased approach by suggesting that courts applying the latter considered other factors (such as an
employee's education and business experience) that fall within the totality test. Id. at 689 n.2 (citing
Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 n. 10 (6th Cir. 1986) and Pilon v. Univ.
of Minn., 710 F.2d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1983)). But see supra note 59 (explaining that consideration
of similar waiver-related facts under the two approaches does not mean that they constitute the
same legal test).
103. Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689-90. The Tenth Circuit actually borrowed its version of the totality
test from the Third Circuit's 1988 decision in Cirillov. Arco Chemical Co., 862 F.2d 448,451 (3d
Cir. 1988). Torrez, 908 F.2d at 689-90. See also supra note 64 (discussing Cirillo).
104. Torrez, 908 F.2d at 690.
105. Id.
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believed that he was only releasing other claims, which the court viewed
as reasonable "for a high school educated employee, unfamiliar with the
law"' 6 and (2) Torrez had not actually consulted with an attorney during
the one-month period in which he had the waiver before signing it. 107
Like Coventry, the Torrez decision demonstrates how EmployeeDependent Factors (such as whether an employee actually retains legal
counsel and whether an employee's education and personal background
leads to an inaccurate belief about the scope of a waiver) can nullify a
waiver, notwithstanding an employer's good-faith steps to ensure the
validity of the waiver.
4. 1991: The Fourth Circuit Opts for the
Pure Contract-Based Approach
In only a three-year span from 1988 through 1990, five circuits-the
Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth-adopted the totality test for
determining whether a waiver of federal employment claims was knowing
and voluntary. In April 1991, the Fourth Circuit made a different choice
by favoring a pure contract-based approach.
In O'Sheav. CommercialCredit Corp.,'0 8 the Fourth Circuit recognized
that the circuits were split as to "the appropriate source of law to be used
in assessing the validity of a particular waiver."' 9 The court noted that
some circuits "have agreed that ordinary contract principles should be
applied in determining whether a release was knowingly and voluntarily
given,"" whereas other circuits "apply a more stringent federal 'totality
of the circumstances' test, on the grounds that the congressional purpose
of eliminating discrimination in employment is better served thereby." '
The Fourth Circuit concluded that "the better approach is to analyze
waivers of ADEA claims under ordinary contract principles."' 1 2 Yet, the
court did not explain why it viewed the pure contract-based approach as

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 930 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1991).
109. Id. at 361. The Fourth Circuit also concluded that ADEA waivers did not require
government supervision in order to be valid. Id. (relying on the other circuits that had reached the
same conclusion).
110. Id. at 361,362 (referencing the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register
Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1044 n.10 (6th Cir. 1986), and the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Lancaster v.
Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 1987)).
111. Id. at 361 (referencing the Second Circuit's Bormann v. AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d
399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989), the Third Circuit's Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 523 (3d
Cir. 1988), and the Fifth Circuit's O'Hare v. Global Natural Res., Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th
Cir. 1990), opinions).
112. Id. at 362. The OWBPA did not apply to O'Shea's ADEA waiver, because she signed it
prior to the OWBPA's effective date. See id. at 359-60.
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better." 3 Nonetheless, applying Maryland contract law (which viewed a
"release to be nothing but an ordinary contract" that can be set aside "for
the same reasons that... may void [any] contract"l), 114 the court found that
there was "[no] doubt that O'Shea's decision to execute the agreement was
voluntary, deliberate, and informed." ' ll . Relying on traditional contract
principles, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that O'Shea's waiver was clear and
unambiguous, was supported by valid consideration, and had not been
procured by fraud or duress.16
5. 1992: The Eleventh Circuit Adopts the Totality Test
The O'Shea decision was only a temporary hiccup in the rise of the
totality test within the federal circuits. By mid-1992, the Eleventh Circuit
joined the five other circuits that had adopted the totality test to determine
if a waiver was knowing and voluntary. In Gormin v. Brown-Forman
Corp.,' 7 the Eleventh Circuit was asked to "articulate [for the district court
on remand] the correct standard for assessing the validity of a release" of
ADEA age discrimination claims." 8 The court recognized that some
circuits had used a "'totality of the circumstances test"' while others had
applied "ordinary contract principles." 9
The Eleventh Circuit opted for the totality test to determine whether a
waiver is knowing and voluntary.' 20 It reasoned that, despite the "different
labels for the standard,"'' courts have "essentially followed the same
process for making that determination."122 On remand, the Eleventh Circuit
instructed the lower court to consider the factors from Bormann's totality
test, which included the six Coventry factors in addition to whether the
113. See id. at 362 (noting that the contract-based approach was "better" without further
elaboration).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 963 F.2d 323 (llth Cir. 1992).
118. Id. at 327. The district court had ruled that ADEA waivers required government
supervision in order to be valid. Id. at 326-27. Thus, on appeal, Brown-Forman Corp. had requested
that, if the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with that ruling, it articulate on remand the proper standard
for determining whether the plaintiffs ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary. Id. at 327. The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that ADEA waivers did not require government supervision in order
to be valid. Id. at 326 (relying on the other circuits that had reached the same conclusion).
119. Id. at 327 (quoting O'Shea, 930 F.2d at 361-62).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The Eleventh Circuit's point is similar to that made in Coventry and Torrez-namely,
that courts ultimately evaluate similarfacts to make the knowing and voluntary determination,
whether they use the totality test or a pure contract-based approach. But see supra note 59
(explaining that consideration of similar waiver-related facts under the two approaches does not
mean that they constitute the same legal test).
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employer encourages (or discourages) an employee to consult with legal
counsel. 123
6. 1995: The First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits Adopt
the Totality Test
For three years after Gormin, no new circuits adopted the totality test.
However, that lull ended abruptly in 1995 when the First, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits raised the total number of totality test jurisdictions to
nine.
In Piercev. Atchison, Topeka andSanta FeRailway Co., 24 the Seventh
Circuit chose the totality test over a pure contract-based approach for
determining whether an ADEA and Title VII waiver was knowing and
voluntary. 25 The court noted that the circuits "disagree as to the
appropriate source of law to be used in determining whether a release of
' On the one hand, the
federal civil rights is knowing and voluntary."126
Seventh Circuit noted that the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits applied
a "general principles of contract construction" approach whereby a waiver
' On the other hand, the
is enforced if it passes "contract law muster."127
court recognized that the Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits used "a federal 'totality of the circumstances' approach" that
"requires a detailed look at the circumstances surrounding execution of the
release in addition to, rather than as a replacement for, ordinary contract
considerations. ' 28
The Seventh Circuit adopted the latter approach. 129 While recognizing
123. Gormin, 963 F.2d at 327. Like the Second Circuit in Bormann, the Eleventh Circuit also
considered whether the employee had a "fair opportunity" to actually consult with legal counsel
prior to waiver signature. Id. However, this additional consideration is the functional equivalent of
the second Coventry factor (the amount of time that the employee had the waiver before signature).
See Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 523-24 (3d Cir. 1988).
124. 65 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1995).
125. Id. at 571. The OWBPA did not apply to the ADEA waiver because Pierce signed it
before the OWBPA's effective date. See id. at 567.
126. Id. at 570.
127. Id.; see cases discussed supraParts II.B, II.C.4.
128. Pierce,65 F.3d at 570; see cases discussed supra Part II.C. The court omitted the Ninth
Circuit from the totality test list, although it referenced the Ninth Circuit's 1989 Stroman opinion
in a string cite of totality test circuit cases. Pierce, 65 F.3d at 570.
129. Pierce, 65 F.3d at 571. The court also stated that the lower courts "need not apply the
totality ofthe circumstances approach" when a plaintiff "never disputes the knowing and voluntary
nature of his release" and does not "first raise a challenge to his consent." Id. at 571-72. The court
explained that raising "traditional state law defenses to the validity of the contract" (such as "offer,
acceptance or consideration, or... duress or fraud") is distinct from raising a defense based on the
knowing and voluntary standard. Id. at 572.
While the Seventh Circuit was theoretically correct that a court will only have to apply the
totality test when the knowing and voluntary challenge is made, knowledgeable plaintiffs counsel
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"the critical role that the plain language of the contract plays," 30 the court
reasoned that "inquiry into knowledge and voluntariness cannot end" with
the waiver's plain language, but must extend to the totality of
circumstances surrounding the waiver's signature.13 Like many of its
sister circuits that had adopted the totality test, 132 the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that the test was "consistent with the strong congressional
purpose... to eradicate discrimination in employment." 133

recognize that challenge as a separate defense and usually raise it (along with any other applicable
state defenses) in waiver-related litigation.
130. Id. at 571.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 570.
133. Id. at 571. In opting for the totality test, the court also highlighted its 1989 decision in
Riley v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co., 881 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1989), and its 1991
decision in Fortinov. QuasarCo., 950 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1991). Pierce,65 F.3d at 570-71. While
the Seventh Circuit did allude to the totality test in both of these cases, it did not adopt it in either
case. For a discussion of Riley, see supra note 100.
In Fortino,the Seventh Circuit noted the different approaches for determining whether a waiver
is knowing and voluntary-"ordinary principles of contract law" versus a "'totality of
circumstances' approach." Fortino, 950 F.2d at 394-95. While noting that "[slome day we may
have to choose" between the approaches, the court concluded that it did not have to make that
choice because "[u]nder any approach, Fortino must lose." Id. at 395.
The "some day" came with Pierce,in which the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he facts of [the]
case require[d] [it]" to choose between the two approaches. 65 F.3d at 571. Even though the court
did not explain why the case required the choice, the Seventh Circuit likely believed that, even
though Pierce's Title VII waiver passed muster under traditional contract law defenses, it might not
have been knowing and voluntary under the totality test. See id. at 568-71. Thus, the potential for
varying results under the approaches prompted the court to choose between the two.
Specifically, Pierce presented three contract law defenses to the waiver, and the Seventh Circuit
rejected all of them. Id. at 568-70. As to Pierce's contractual ambiguity defense, the court ruled that
the waiver "clearly encompassed Pierce's discrimination claims" and that the employer's statement
regarding the scope of the waiver did not create any "extrinsic ambiguity" in the face of
unambiguous language. Id. at 568. As to his duress defense, the court concluded that Pierce's
humiliation at being terminated could not, as a matter of law, constitute duress. Id. at 569. As to
his fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation defense, the court found that Pierce's reliance on
any alleged misrepresentation regarding the waiver's limited scope was not reasonable in light of
the clear, broad language of the waiver. Id. at 569-70.
While the Seventh Circuit did not explain how or why the totality test might invalidate Pierce's
waiver that had otherwise survived these contract law defenses, the following factors likely led the
court to believe that the waiver might not have been knowing and voluntary: (1) the short time
Pierce was given to review and sign the waiver (one or two days) and (2) Pierce's lack of actual
legal representation prior to signing the waiver. See id. at 567. Indeed, the test's remaining factors
appeared to point to a knowing and voluntary waiver, as: (1) Pierce had business experience
including over twenty years of work at Santa Fe Railway Co., he was familiar with his rights under
the discrimination laws, and he had previously rejected a severance package with a full waiver of
claims; (2) Pierce had actually requested the severance package and negotiated an extra day to
review the agreement; (3) the agreement was clear; (4) Pierce had read the waiver before signing;
(5) valid consideration supported the agreement; and (6) Pierce was told that he could consult with
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The Seventh Circuit varied its totality test by adding to the six Coventry
factors another Employee-Dependent Factor: "whether the employee
' The
actually read the release and considered its terms before signing it."134
court then remanded the case to the district court for the trial judge ("and
possibly a... jury") to apply the totality test and determine if Pierce
135 had
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Title VII and ADEA rights.
Less than two months after Pierce, the Sixth Circuit-which had
applied the pure contract-based approach nine years earlier in37
Runyan 136 -shifted to the totality test in Adams v. Philip Morris,Inc.
The Adams court did not acknowledge that it was changing from Runyan' s
approach to the totality test, and it did not offer further rationale for its
shift. 138
For its totality test, the Sixth Circuit stated that it would "look to" the
following factors:
(1) plaintiff' s experience, background, and education; (2) the
amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign
the waiver, including whether the employee had an
opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of the
waiver; (4) consideration for13the
waiver; as well as (5) the
9
totality of the circumstances.
Applying these factors, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Adams' waiver
was knowing and voluntary, thus barring his ADEA and Title VII

an attorney, and he in fact consulted with the EEOC prior to signing it. Id. at 566-67.
134. Id. at 571. As part of its totality test, the Seventh Circuit also included "whether the
employee's release was induced by improper conduct on the defendant's part." Id. This factor
would appear to embody the traditional contract defenses of duress, fraudulent inducement, or
coercion.
135. Id. at 572.
136. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text (discussing Runyan).
137. 67 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
138. In fact, between its 1986 Runyan and 1995 Adams decisions, the Sixth Circuit continued
to recognize that it used the pure contract-based approach to determine whether a waiver of federal
employment claims was knowing and voluntary. See Tura v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Nos. 90-3419,
90-3445, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11792, at *4-6 (6th Cir. May 28, 1991) (stating that "[t]he Sixth
Circuit and Eighth Circuit apply ordinary contract principles in determining whether a waiver has
been knowingly and voluntarily executed" and rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the totality
test "represents an evolution in the law since Runyan"); Shaheen v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 873 F.2d
105, 107 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[i]f 'overreaching or exploitation is not inherent in the
situation,' we will examine waivers of employee rights under normal contract principles" and
enforce those waivers "absent the typical exceptions for fraud, duress, lack of consideration or
mutual mistake" (citations omitted) (quoting Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 121-22 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
139. Adams, 67 F.3d at 583.
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discrimination claims.'O The court relied on the following EmployeeDependent and Employer-Controlled Factors: (1) Adams had supervisory
experience and was "generally knowledgeable and aware of his rights"; (2)
the clear waiver was "easily understandable by someone of Adams'
abilities"; and (3) Adams had five days in which to consider the waiver
and consult an attorney before signing it."'
The final circuit to adopt the totality test was the First Circuit in Smart
v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan.142 While prior circuits had
initially adopted the totality test for ADEA or Title VII waivers, the First
Circuit did so for waivers of employee welfare benefit claims under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).' 43
The Smart court concluded that "[o]nly an inquiry into the totality of
the circumstances can determine whether there has been a knowing and
voluntary relinquishment" of an individual's ERISA rights.144 The First
Circuit also noted that "no single fact or circumstance is entitled to
talismanic significance on the question of waiver."' 145 In adopting the
totality test, the court reasoned that "courts should scrutinize an ostensible
waiver with care" in light of the congressional policy of preserving
ERISA-related rights.'"
For its totality test, the First Circuit listed "a compendium of six
factors"' 47 that were essentially the same as the six Coventry factors,
except that it added the employee's "sophistication" to the education and

140. Id. at 583. The OWBPA did not apply to Adams' ADEA waiver because he signed it
before the OWBPA's effective date. See id. at 582-83.
141. Id. Two years after its Adams decision, the Sixth Circuit appeared to return to Runyan's
pure contract-based approach in Mararriv. WCI Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1997)
(citing Runyan and Shaheen and stating that "waivers of employee rights are to be examined under
normal contract principles unless overreaching or exploitation is inherent in the situation"); see also
Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Sixth Circuit has
"endorsed the application of common law doctrines to waivers and releases" and that "'normal
contract principles"' should apply to waivers in "the absence of overreaching or exploitation"
(quoting Shaheen, 873 F.2d at 107 (6th Cir. 1989)). However, subsequent Sixth Circuit opinions
followed Adams rather than Mararri.See infra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing Sixth
Circuit decisions applying the totality test).
142. 70 F.3d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 1995); see supra Part II.C.
143. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000 & Supp. H 2002); Smart, 70 F.3d at 181.
144. Smart, 70 F.3d at 181.
145. Id.
146. Id. The First Circuit also relied on precedent from the Second Circuit that had applied a
totality test to waivers of ERISA-related claims. Id. (discussing the Second Circuit's decisions in
Finz v. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1992), and Laniok v. Advisory Comm. of Brainerd
Mfg. Co. Pension Plan, 935 F.2d 1360, 1368 (2d Cir. 1991)). The Second Circuit decided Laniok
and Finz-both ERISA cases-after its 1989 opinion in Bormann, in which it initially adopted the
totality test. Bormann v. AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989).
147. Smart, 70F.3dat 181.
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business experience factor.'4 8 Concluding that Smart' s ERISA waiver was
knowing and voluntary, the First Circuit significantly relied on the
following Employee-Dependent Factors: (1) Smart was "well-educated
and commercially sophisticated," with a college degree and ten years of
"professional experience" as a product analyst for Gillette; (2) Smart was
represented by legal counsel prior to signing the waiver; and (3) Smart had
successfully negotiated certain changes into the severance agreement.'49
In addition, the court noted that Smart had at least twelve days in which to
review the severance agreement-a time period that "seem[ed] ample to
permit a sophisticated businesswoman and her lawyer carefully to review
the terms."' 15
Since Alexander set the knowing and voluntary standard for a waiver
of federal employment claims in 1974,' the federal circuits have split as
to the best method for determining whether a waiver meets that
standard. 52 The limited circuits that initially addressed the issue in the
1980s viewed the waiver as a contract and tended to apply traditional
contract principles (such as contract clarity, consideration, and the absence
of duress, fraud, or mutual mistake) to make the knowing and voluntary
determination."'
By 1995, however, nine circuits-the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh-had adopted their own versions of
the totality test to determine whether a waiver of federal employment
claims met Alexander's knowing and voluntary standard. 154 These circuits
still adhere to that test when evaluating these waivers, 155 while only two

148. Id. at 181 n.3.
149. Id. at 182.
150. Id.
151. See supra Part II.A.
152. See supra Part Il.C.
153. See supra Part H.B.
154. See supra Part I.C.
155. See, e.g., Dorn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 131 F. App'x 462,468-69 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying
the totality test and concluding that the plaintiff had knowingly and voluntarily waived his ADEA
claims); Cuchara v. Gai-tronics Corp., 129 F. App'x 728, 730-32 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the
totality test and concluding that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his Title VII, ADA,
and ERISA claims); Yablon v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan Ret. Plan and Trust, 98 F. App'x 55,
57 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying the totality test and concluding that the plaintiff knowingly and
voluntarily waived his ERISA claims); Nicklin v. Henderson, 352 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (6th Cir.
2003) (applying the totality test and concluding that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived
his disability discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-718
(2000 & Supp. II 2002)); Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 441, 443-44 (5th Cir. 2002)
(applying the totality test and concluding that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived her Title
VII sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation claims); Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus.,
Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 276-78 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying the totality test and concluding that the plaintiff
knowingly and voluntarily waived her Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation claims); Bennett
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circuits-the Fourth and the Eighth-still apply the pure contract-based
approach. 156

v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1228-29 (10th Cit. 1999) (finding that the district court had
erred by not applying the totality test to the plaintiffs' ADEA waivers on the "issue of whether the
waivers were knowing and voluntary"); Morais v. Cent. Beverage Corp. Union Employees' Supp.
Ret. Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 712-15 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying the totality test and concluding that the
plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his ERISA claims); Tung v. Texaco Inc., 150 F.3d 206,
208 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying the totality test and concluding that the plaintiff knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Title VII race and national origin discrimination claims); Livingston v.
Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 438-39 (2d Cir. 1998) (remanding to the district court to
evaluate the plaintiffs waiver of Title VU race harassment claims under the totality test); Bledsoe
v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conserv. Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 819-20 (11th Cir. 1998)
(applying the totality test and remanding the case for a jury trial on whether the plaintiff knowingly
and voluntarily waived his ADA claims); Rivera-Flores v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Caribbean, 112
F.3d 9, 10-14 (1 st Cir. 1997) (applying the totality test and concluding that the plaintiff knowingly
and voluntarily waived his ADA and ERISA claims); Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 110 F.3d 431, 437, 434-35 (7th Ci. 1997) (justifying its adoption of the totality test over a
pure contract-based approach because the latter "does not give sufficient weight to the federal
interest in ensuring that the goals of the ADEA are not undermined by private agreements born of
circumstances in which employees.., lack information regarding their legal alternatives"); Wagner
v. Nutrasweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 531-33 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the totality test and concluding
that two plaintiffs had knowingly and voluntarily waived their Title VII sex discrimination and
Equal Pay Act pay claims); Puentes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 198-99 (11 th Cir.
1996) (applying the totality test and remanding the case for a jury trial on whether the plaintiffs
knowingly and voluntarily waived their Title VII race and national origin discrimination claims);
Vaefaga v. Or. Steel Mills, No. 94-35705, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 34930, *3-5 (9th Cir. Nov. 17,
1995) (applying the totality test and concluding that the plaintiff's Title VII waiver was "'voluntary,
deliberate, and informed"' (quoting Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458,462 (9th Cir.
1989))); Rutledge v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 91-1385, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18501, *4-12
(10th Cir. August 6, 1992) (applying the totality test in a pre-OWBPA case and concluding that the
plaintiff had knowingly and voluntarily waived his ADEA age discrimination claim); Wright v. Sw.
Bell Tel. Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying the totality test and concluding
that the plaintiff had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Title VII race discrimination and
ERISA claims).
156. See, e.g., Warnebold v. Union Pac. R.R., 963 F.2d 222, 223 n.2, 224 (8th Cir. 1992)
(comparing, in a pre-OWBPA case, the court's "'ordinary contract principles"' approach from
Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1987), to the totality test "used by
[the] other circuits" and finding that plaintiff had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Title VII
reverse sex discrimination and ADEA claims); Ulvin v. Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 943 F.2d 862, 866
(8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting an opt-in class plaintiffs argument to use the "more stringent" totality
test in lieu of the Eighth Circuit's pure contract-based approach from Lancasterand affirming the
district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary, because
it contained "clear, simple language," was supported by consideration, and was signed "of his own
free will"); Todd v. Blue Ridge Legal Servs., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 857, 862-65 (W.D. Va. 2001)
(after noting that some circuits have used the totality test, finding "no reason to deviate" from
O'Shea'sapproach and then applying Virginia's "ordinary contract principles" to conclude that the
plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived her claims under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(2000), because consideration existed and there was no duress); Musgrave v. Conagra, Inc., No.
8:00CV78, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15914, *6 (D. Neb. Oct. 30,2000) (citing Lancasterand noting
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III. CONGRESSIONAL AcTIvITY IN THE KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY
WAIVER ARENA

In 1990, Congress passed the OWBPA. 157 Title II of the OWBPA sets
forth specific requirements that must be met before an employee's waiver
of ADEA claims can be considered knowing and voluntary.158 At the time
the OWBPA was enacted, five federal circuits had already adopted the
totality test.159
The OWBPA was the culmination of three years of congressional
wrangling with the courts and the EEOC regarding ADEA waivers. An
understanding of this history lends greater insight into the OWBPA, its
requirements, and the sources of those requirements.
A. Act One: The FederalCircuits and EEOC Permit Unsupervised
ADEA Waivers
Prior to the OWBPA, a key question before the federal circuits and the
EEOC had been whether an ADEA waiver must be supervised by the
courts or the EEOC in order to be valid. The circuits and the EEOC agreed
on the answer to that question.
From 1986 through 1990, five federal circuits-the Second Circuit in

that "the validity and enforceability of [plaintiff's Title VII waiver] is controlled by principles of
state contract law"); Horton v. Norfolk S. Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 330, 339-40 (M.D.N.C. 1999)
(citing O'Shea v. Comm. Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1991), and then applying North
Carolina law on contract "execution, validity, and interpretation" to find that the plaintiff validly
waived his Title VII race discrimination claim because there was no mutual mistake in the
agreement's execution).
Thus, although the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have not revisited the knowing and voluntary
waiver issue since O'Shea (for the Fourth Circuit) and Wamebold and Ulvin (for the Eighth
Circuit), the above-referenced district court opinions in Todd and Horton (both within the Fourth
Circuit) and Musgrave (within the Eighth Circuit) evidence continued application of the pure
contract-based approach within those circuits.
157. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 630 (2000)).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000). In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Public
Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), Congress enacted Title I of the
OWBPA to clarify that "discrimination on the basis of age in virtually all forms of employee
benefits" is unlawful under the ADEA. S. REP. No. 101-263, at 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1510 [hereinafter Senate OWBPA Report]. See also Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (stating that "legislative
action is necessary" after Betts to "restore" Congress's intent that the ADEA prohibit age-based
discrimination in "all employee benefits except when age-based reductions in employee benefit
plans are justified by significant cost considerations"). In Betts, the Court had held that the ADEA's
prohibitions did not apply to employee benefits and employee benefit plans, except in limited
situations. 492 U.S. at 177-79.
159. See supra Part II.C.
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Bonnann, the Third Circuit in Coventry, the Fifth Circuit in O'Hare,the
Sixth Circuit in Runyan, and the Eighth Circuit in Lancaster--concluded
that a person could privately waive an ADEA claim without government
supervision."6 While agreeing on this issue, these federal circuits
disagreed as to the appropriate test or approach for determining whether
that unsupervised ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary; some opted
for a pure contract-based approach, while others adopted the totality test. 16
The EEOC viewed the ADEA waiver issue similarly to the federal
circuits. In late August 1987, the EEOC issued a final rule that permitted
unsupervised ADEA waivers as long as they met certain requirements. 6 2
Entitled "Exemption Allowing Non-EEOC Supervised Waivers Under the
ADEA," the rule permitted an unsupervised ADEA waiver if the following
conditions were met: (1) the waiver was "knowing and voluntary"; (2) it
did not waive ADEA rights or claims that arose prospectively (in the
future); and (3) it was supported by consideration163beyond any employee
benefits to which the person was already entitled.

160. In reaching this conclusion, these circuits rejected the argument that the ADEA's
incorporation of FLSA enforcement procedures meant that ADEA waivers required government
supervision just like FLSA waivers. See O'Hare v. Global Natural Res., Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 101617, 1016 n.1 (5th Cir. 1990); Bormann v. AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399,401-02 (2d Cir.
1989); Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 521 n.8 (3d Cir. 1988); Lancaster v. Buerkle
Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 540 (8th Cir. 1987); Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787
F.2d 1039, 1041-43 (6th Cir. 1986).
The ADEA specifies that its rights are to be "enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies,
and procedures" provided under particular FLSA sections, and it also states that certain damage
amounts from an ADEA violation "shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation [under the FLSA]." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000). The Supreme Court had
used this link between the ADEA and the FLSA to extend the FLSA's right to a jury trial to the
ADEA, which had been silent on the issue. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-83 (1978)
(suggesting that Congress "intended to incorporate fully the remedies and procedures of the FLSA"
into the ADEA); Jan W. Henkel, Discriminationby Supervisors:PersonalLiabilityUnderFederal
Employment DiscriminationStatutes, 49 FLA. L. REv. 767, 779-82 (1997) (observing that the
ADEA's enforcement procedures are based on FLSA standards).
161. While the federal circuits that initially adopted the totality test (such as the Third Circuit
in Coventry, the Second Circuit in Bormann, and the Fifth Circuit in O'Hare)did so in ADEA
cases, this ADEA link did not reflect any judicial intent to limit the test to ADEA cases only.
Instead, this link was the result of timing, because the waiver issue du jour among the federal
circuits in the mid-to-late 1980s was whether ADEA waivers required government supervision like
waivers of FLSA claims. See supra Part II.C. Indeed, later federal circuits adopted the totality test
for non-ADEA waivers. See Smart v. Gillette Co. Long Term Dis. Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 181 (1st Cir.
1995) (ERISA case); Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir.
1995) (Title VII and ADEA case); Torrez v. Pub. Serv. Co., 908 F.2d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 1990)
(Title VII case); Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1989) (Title VII
case).
162. Exemption Allowing Non-EEOC Supervised Waivers Under the ADEA, 52 Fed. Reg.
32,293 (Aug. 27, 1987).
163. Id. at 32, 293, 32, 296.
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In addition to setting forth these requirements, the EEOC's rule also
provided guidance regarding its "knowing and voluntary" waiver
requirement. Although the rule did not create any necessary or sufficient
criteria, it listed the following factors as "indicative" of a knowing and
voluntary waiver: (1) that the waiver was written in understandable
language and clearly waived ADEA rights; (2) that the employee had a
"reasonable period of time" to deliberate before waiver signature; and (3)
that the employee was encouraged to consult with legal counsel before
signing the waiver."
The EEOC's rule-which preceded the Third Circuit's totality test in
Coventry by one year-can be viewed as an early formulation of that test.
Like Coventry's totality test, the rule considered (1) the time that an
employee had the agreement before signing it (the second Coventry
factor), (2) the agreement's clarity (the fourth Coventry factor), and (3)
whether valid consideration supported the agreement (the sixth Coventry
factor). 65 The rule also considered whether the employer encouraged the
employee to consult with legal counsel," 6 which was not in Coventry's
167 test
tests.
totality
circuits'
many
within
factor
a
became
later
but which
However, the EEOC's rule was not a complete predecessor to the
totality test because it did not include any of the test's EmployeeDependent Factors, such as the employee's education, background, and
business experience; whether the employee actually consulted with an
attorney before signing the waiver; the role that an employee played in
deciding the terms of the agreement; whether the employee actually knew
or should have known of his or her employment rights upon signing the
waiver; and whether the employee
actually read the waiver and considered
168
it.
signing
before
its terms
B. Act Two: Congress Suspends the EEOC's FinalRule
The EEOC's final rule-which was slated to take effect on September
27, 1987-was received poorly by Congress. Propelled by a "grave
concern" that permitting unsupervised ADEA waivers was against public
policy and "without legal foundation,"' 69 Congress acted quickly to block

164. Id. at 32, 294.
165. See id.
166. Id.
167. See supra notes 74, 103, 123 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 60, 64, 103, 134 and accompanying text.
169. See 135 CONG. REc. E816, 816 (1989) (statement of Rep. Hawkins). The "without legal
foundation" concern stemmed from the ADEA's incorporation of FLSA enforcement procedures.
See generally 134 CONG. REc. S 14511 (1988) (Letter of June 7, 1988) (highlighting the "doubtful
validity of the EEOC interpretation of Congress[ional] intent when it incorporated the FLSA
enforcement procedures into the ADEA"); 134 CONG. REc. S14511 (1988) (Letter of June 13,
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the EEOC from enforcing the rule. In October 1987, Congress amended
its appropriations bill to prevent the EEOC from using budgeted funds to
enforce the rule during fiscal year 1988.170 Congress took similar measures
in its appropriations bills for fiscal years 1989 and 1990.171
C. Act Three: CongressIntroduces the Waiver
ProtectionAct-The Predecessorto the OWBPA
Congress did not stop after blocking the EEOC from enforcing its rule.
In early 1989, both the Senate and House of Representatives introduced
versions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act
of 1989 (Waiver Protection Act). 172 While Congress never passed the Act,
it borrowed several of the Act's provisions for the OWBPA one year later.
Except in limited circumstances, the Waiver Protection Act would have
prohibited individuals from waiving ADEA claims "without the
supervision of the [EEOC] or a court. ' 1 73 But, if the following two
conditions precedent were met, then unsupervised ADEA waivers were
allowed: (1) the ADEA claim must have already been formalized at the
time of the waiver and (2) the waiver must satisfy certain requirements
indicating that it was knowing and voluntary.'74
The first condition precedent was that the unsupervised ADEA waiver
must have been "in settlement" of a "bona fide claim" of age
discrimination against the employer. 175 The Act's definition of "bona fide
claim" included only three types of formalized age discrimination claims:
(1) an age discrimination charge filed with the EEOC; (2) an age
discrimination lawsuit filed in court; or (3) a "specific allegation of age
discrimination" that had been communicated to the employer in good faith
and in writing. 176 Because this first condition limited "bona fide" claims
to those that had already been pursued, it would have significantly

1988) (noting the "tension between recent lower court decisions permitting unsupervised waivers
under the ADEA and established Supreme Court precedent incorporating into the ADEA the
enforcement procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act"); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-664, at 2022 (1990) (House Report accompanying OWBPA) [hereinafter House OWBPA Report] (discussing
Congress's concerns regarding the EEOC's rule).
170. See Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 101, 101 Stat. 1329, 1331 (1988)
(appropriating funds for fiscal year 1988); see also House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 2022 (noting amendments to fiscal year 1988 EEOC appropriations bill).
171. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 407, 102 Stat. 2186, 2216 (1988); House
OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 20-22.
172. S.54, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 1432, 101st Cong. (1989).
173. S.54, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989).
174. Id.; H.R. 1432, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989).
175. S.54, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989); H.R. 1432, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989).
176. S.54, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989); H.R. 1432, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989).
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restricted (if not precluded) an employer from proactively using waivers
as a method to 77prevent ADEA claims or lawsuits from being initiated in
the first place.
The second condition precedent was that the unsupervised ADEA
waiver must meet the following requirements demonstrating that it was
knowing and voluntary: (1) the settlement agreement was in writing and
"specifically refer[red]" to rights or claims arising under the ADEA; (2)
the agreement did not waive ADEA claims that arose prospectively (after
the agreement was signed); (3) the waiver was in exchange for
consideration to which the employee was not already entitled; (4) the
employee was "given a reasonable period" of time to consider the
agreement before waiver signature, with the House bill requiring "not less
than 14 days"; 178 and (5) the employee was advised in writing to consult
an attorney before waiver signature.'7 9
Somewhat ironically, the Waiver Protection Act paralleled the EEOC's
final rule, which Congress had previously suspended, in two respects.
First, the rule appeared to be the source for many of the Act's "knowing
and voluntary" requirements. Four of the Act's five
requirements-namely, requirements (2), (3), (4), and (5)-mirrored
waiver requirements and knowing and voluntary criteria from the EEOC's
final rule."° Requirements (3) and (4)--dealing with valid consideration
and affording an employee time to review the waiver, respectively-also
had appeared in Coventry's totality test. l8 ' Indeed, the Act's only unique
requirement was including a specific reference to ADEA rights in the
waiver. 8 2 Second, like the EEOC rule, the Waiver Protection
Act-introduced six months after the Third Circuit's Coventry
decision-did not include any of the totality test's Employee-Dependent
Factors. 8 3
177. See N. Jansen Calamita, Note, The Older Workers Benefit ProtectionAct of 1990: The
End ofRatification and Tender Back in ADEA Waiver Cases, 73 B.U. L. REV. 639,646-47 (1993)
(observing that the Waiver Protection Act "would have virtually eliminated the prophylactic use
of waivers by employers" and allowed ADEA waivers to be used only as "settlement tool[s]" in a
litigation, post-claim setting); see also Gregory C. Parliman, ProposedCongressionalLimitations
upon the Use of Unsupervised Waivers of ADEA Claims, 15 EMP. REL. L.J. 541, 547 (1990)
(observing that, under the Waiver Protection Act, proactive employers could not obtain a valid
ADEA waiver "without 'creating' claims by encouraging discharged employees to make written
claims of age discrimination").
178. H.R. 1432, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989).
179. S. 54, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989); H.R. 1432, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989). The House bill also
required that the person be informed that another individual could accompany him or her to
"witness or assist" during negotiation of the ADEA claim. H.R. 1432, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989).
180. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part IB.C. 1 (discussing Coventry).
182. See supra notes 163-64, 177-79 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
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Despite these similarities to the EEOC's rule, the Waiver Protection
Act differed from the rule (and Coventry's totality test) by transforming
the knowing and voluntary criteria (or factors) into per se waiver
requirements. 1 4 This feature of the Act-along with the actual five
requirements demonstrating a knowing and voluntary waiver-would
appear a year later in the OWBPA. 8 5 Consequently, even though Congress
never brought the Waiver Protection Act to a full vote, much of its work
on the Act laid the foundation for the OWBPA.
D. The FinalAct: Congress Passes the OWBPA
On October 16, 1990, Congress enacted the OWBPA. 186 The OWBPA
differs significantly from the Waiver Protection Act by allowing
unsupervised ADEA waivers on a much broader scale because there is no
requirement that an age discrimination claim be formalized and adversarial
at the time of waiver.'87
Like the Waiver Protection Act, however, the OWBPA enumerates per
se requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver; it does not merely list
(like the EEOC's final rule and the totality test) the criteria or factors that
are relevant in making that determination. Specifically, the OWBPA states
that a person "may not waive" an ADEA claim "unless the waiver is
knowing and voluntary."' 88 This ADEA "waiver may not be considered
knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum" the following seven per se
requirements are met: 189
(1) the waiver is part of an employer-employee agreement
that is "written in a manner calculated to be understood"
by that employee or "the average individual eligible to
participate" in the severance package or program;' 9°

184. See supra notes 174, 178-79 and accompanying text.
185. See infra Part m.D.
186. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 630 (2000)).
187. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000). Because the House version of the OWBPA was based
substantially on the Waiver Protection Act, it contained a "bona fide claim" requirement. See H.R.
3200, 101st Cong. § 201 (1990); see also House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 4-5, 61-62,
68-70 (setting forth requirements for a bona fide claim). The Senate version, which passed, dropped
that requirement. See S. 1511, 101st Cong. § 201 (1990); Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158,
at 4243.
188. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (2000).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 626(f)(1)(A). Congress said that it "expects... courts will pay close attention to the
language used in the agreement, to ensure that the language is readily understandable to individual
employees regardless of their education or business experience." Senate OWBPA Report, supra
note 158, at 32-33; House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 51.
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(2) the waiver "specifically refers to rights or claims arising
under" the ADEA;' 91

(3) the waiver does not encompass rights
or claims that arise
192
after the date the waiver is signed;
(4) the waiver is in exchange for consideration that is in
addition to anything to which the employee is already
entitled; 193

(5) the employee "is advised in writing to consult with an
attorney prior to executing the agreement"194;

(6) the employee is given at least twenty-one days in which to
consider the agreement;1 95 and
(7) the agreement affords the employee at least seven days
after signing the agreement to revoke it. 196
The OWBPA slightly lessens these seven standard requirements for a
waiver of an ADEA claim that has already been filed with the EEOC or in
court.1 97 However, it imposes two additional requirements for an ADEA
waiver that an employee signs in conjunction with a larger scale
termination program (i.e., a reduction-in-force) offered to a "group or class
191. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B) (2000). Congress noted that "[t]his degree of clarity and
specificity increases the chances that individuals will know their rights upon execution of a
waiver." Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 32; House OWBPA Report, supra note 169,
at 51.
192. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (2000). Congress stated that "[it is a basic principle of fairness
that employees should not be permitted to waive rights or claims on a prospective basis." Senate
OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 33; House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 51.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(D) (2000).
194. Id. § 626(f)(1)(E). Congress said that "it is vitally important that the employee understand
the magnitude of what he or she is undertaking" and that "[Ilegal counsel is in the best position to
help the individual reach that understanding." House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 52. But,
Congress also recognized that "[a]n employee cannot be required to hire an attorney before signing
a waiver." Id.
195. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(I) (2000). Congress explained that
[a]n employee who is terminated needs time to recover from the shock of losing
a job, especially when that job was held for a long period. The employee needs
time to learn about the conditions of termination, including any benefits being
offered by the employer. Time also is necessary to locate and consult with an
attorney if the employee wants to determine what legal rights may exist.
Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 33; House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 51.
196. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(G) (2000). Neither the House nor the Senate OWBPA Report
explained the rationale behind, or the source of, this revocation right. See Senate OWBPA Report,
supra note 158, at 32-33; House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 50-52.
197. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(2) (2000). In this situation, the OWBPA's seven requirements still
apply, except that an employee (1) need only be provided "a reasonable period of time" (rather than
a twenty-one day period) to review the agreement and (2) does not have the seven-day right of
revocation.
Id. § 626(f)(2)(A)-(B).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/2
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of employees." 98
The similarities between the OWBPA's requirements and both the
Waiver Protection Act's requirements and certain totality test factors are
apparent. Indeed, five of the OWBPA's requirements (namely,
requirements (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6)) resemble, if not mirror, all of the
waiver requirements from the Waiver Protection Act, except that the
OWBPA specifies a concrete review period whereas the Senate's version
of the Waiver Protection Act did not.1 99 Four of the OWBPA's
requirements (namely, requirements (1), (4), (5), and (6)) had also
appeared in the totality test, except that the totality test, unlike the
OWBPA, failed to specify the length of the review period.
However, the OWBPA's requirement (7), which affords a revocation
period to the employee, is an altogether new requirement that was
2°
contained in neither the Waiver Protection Act nor the totality test.
Importantly, the OWBPA--enacted after five federal circuits had adopted
the totality test-did not include any of the totality test's EmployeeDependent Factors.
Congress enacted the OWBPA due to perceived inadequacies in the
state of the law on ADEA waivers. Specifically, Congress was aware of
the circuit split regarding what test or approach should be used to
determine if a waiver was knowing and voluntary. 20 ' Indeed, Congress
discussed the "ordinary contract principles approach"-which it labeled
"cursory"-and the "'totality of circumstances' approach"-which it
labeled "more thorough" and "more protective. 20 2 Congress even
proceeded to state that it expected courts to "scrutinize carefully the

198. Id. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii), (H). In this situation, the OWBPA (1) expands the review period
to forty-five days and (2) requires an employer to provide the employee with certain written
information regarding the termination program. Id. This information includes: the class or group
of employees covered by the program; the program's eligibility factors and time limit(s); the job
titles and ages of all employees selected for the program; and the ages of all employees in the same
"job classification or organizational unit" who were not "selected for the program" (i.e., those who
remained employed). Id. § 626(f)(1)(H)(i)-(ii).
Congress added these two extra waiver requirements for "group or class" termination programs
because they "often involve large numbers of employees, and complex financial arrangements."
Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 33. Congress felt that (1) the expanded review period
provided needed additional time "to review options, understand the program, and consult with an
attorney before signing away potentially valid legal claims" and (2) the informational requirements
"permit[ted] older workers to make more informed decisions" and "[gave] all eligible employees
a better picture" of whether their terminations under the program violated the ADEA. Id. at 33-34.
199. See supra Part lII.C.
200. The OWBPA's two additional requirements for ADEA waivers signed in conjunction
with a larger scale termination of a "group or class of employees" are also new. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(0 (2000); supra Part JII.C.
201. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 26.
202. Id. at 27 (quoting Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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complete circumstances in which [a] waiver was executed" and expressed
"support" for the totality test."0 3
However, Congress did not issue a wholesale endorsement of the
totality test. Instead, Congress expressed concern that courts applying the
totality test merely scrutinized "many different factors or criteria on a
case-by-case basis" rather than going the extra step of requiring that
"certain protective factors must be present." 2" As a result, Congress
believed that the totality test's case-by-case approach only served to
"promis[e] more litigation in the future."'2 5 In response, Congress enacted
the OWBPA to "spell out clear and ascertainable standards" to govern
ADEA waivers, "clarify an unsettled area of the law and reverse a
disturbing trend of litigation" concerning those waivers.2' 6
Finally, Congress also recognized that the OWBPA provided
heightened, waiver-related protections only for older workers (those forty
years old or older), rather than for workers in all protected classes.0 7
Congress noted that some OWBPA critics had contended that "older
workers should be treated no differently from the minority and female
workers who are protected against employment discrimination under Title
20 8
Vii."
However, Congress justified its heightened waiver requirements for
older workers on two grounds. First, it noted that the ADEA itself
provided greater procedural protections than Title VII and that this
reflected Congress's prior decision to "treat older workers differently from
workers protected under Title VI.9'209
Second, Congress viewed older workers as more susceptible to being
"manipulated or even coerced into signing away their ADEA
protections.9 210 The greater susceptibility of older workers is why
Congress thought that "the provisions [of the OWBPA] are so
important. 21 ' Congress felt that older workers had this greater
susceptibility due to (1) the circumstances that typically led to their

203. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 51; Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158,
at 32.
204. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 27.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 24.
208. Id.
209. Id. Specifically, the House OWBPA Report noted that ADEA plaintiffs: (1) had a right
to a jury trial and liquidated damages, unlike Title VH plaintiffs at the time; (2) did not have to wait
as long as Title VII plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit after filing an EEOC charge (sixty days versus 180
days); and (3) were entitled to mandatory back pay damages, which were discretionary under Title
VII. See id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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terminations and (2) the challenges that they faced after being
terminated.212
As to the former, Congress explained that older workers were often
discharged as part of reductions-in-force that were less individualized in
nature; as a result, Congress believed that these workers "would not
reasonably be expected to know or suspect that age may have played a role
in the employer's decision, or that the program may be designed to remove
' Indeed, Congress observed that an
older workers from the labor force."213
employer that implements a large scale termination typically "advises [the
affected214workers] that the termination is not a function of their individual
status.
As to the latter, Congress noted that "[a]ge discrimination victims"
tended to have a modest annual income ("only $15,000"), had difficulty
obtaining a new job ("less than a 50/50 chance of ever finding new
employment"), and had "little or no savings. ' 25 As a result, Congress felt
that it was "reasonable to assume that many employees would be coerced
by circumstances
into accepting significant compromises" of their ADEA
21
claims. 216

V. THE TOTALITY TEST EVALUATED

Currently, nine federal circuits use the totality test for determining
whether waivers of non-ADEA federal employment claims (such as those
under Title VII and the ADA) meet Alexander's knowing and voluntary
standard. 217 As initially adopted by the Third Circuit in Coventry, the
totality test included six factors for making this determination: (1) the
employee's education and business experience; (2) the amount of time the
employee had (or had access to) the waiver before signing it; (3) the
employee's role in deciding the terms of the waiver agreement; (4) the

212. Id.
213. Id. at 22-23. See also Senate OWBPA Report, supranote 158, at 32 (stating that "[g]roup
termination and reduction programs stand in stark contrast to the individual
separation... [because] employees affected by these programs have little or no basis to suspect that
action is being taken based on their individual characteristics").
214. Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 32.
215. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 23.
216. Id. In contrast, Congress viewed workers in other protected classes to be treated in a more
individualized manner, which tended to place them "on notice that they are involved in an armslength adversarial relationship" with an employer. Id. at 24. As a result, Congress believed these
workers-who "[t]ypically ... recognize and complain about unequal treatment"--to be less
susceptible to coercion or manipulation in waiving their non-ADEA rights. Id.
217. The totality test does not apply to an employee's waiver of claims regarding minimum
wage and overtime compensation violations under the FLSA, because a waiver of FLSA claims
must be supervised by either the U.S. Department ofLabor or a court. See supra notes 40, 160, 169
(discussing the supervised waiver requirement of the FLSA).
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waiver's clarity; (5) whether the employee actually consulted with, or was
represented by, legal counsel before signing the waiver; and (6) whether
the employee received consideration that exceeded any benefits to which
he or she was already entitled.21 8
The totality test evolved after Coventry, as several federal circuits
adopting the totality test added or varied factors for their respective tests.
Examples of these additional or modified factors include the following: (1)
whether the employer advised or encouraged the employee to seek legal
counsel before waiver signature; 21 9 (2) whether the employee knew or
should have known of his or her rights before waiver signature; 220 (3)
whether the employee actually read the waiver and considered its terms
before signing it;22 ' and (4)the employee's level of "sophistication"
222 (as
part of the inquiry regarding education and business experience).
This Part discusses the three significant features of the totality test, the
problematic consequences that result from two of those features, and the
totality test's inconsistency with the congressional waiver approach
embodied in the OWBPA.
A. The Three Significant Featuresof the Totality Test
The totality test (regardless of the version) has three significant
features: (1) it lacks per se waiver requirements; (2) it includes one set of
waiver factors that rest solely within the employer's control; and (3) it
includes another set of waiver factors that depend solely upon the
employee.223
First, the totality test's factors are mere indicia that a court must
consider to determine if a waiver meets the knowing and voluntary
standard. 224 These factors do not rise to the level of actual requirements
that must be met for a waiver to be knowing and voluntary.225 Indeed, the
courts applying the totality test recognize this feature. For example, the
First Circuit has acknowledged that "[i]t is not necessary that each [factor]
218. See Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 523 (3d Cir. 1988).
219. This factor is included in the totality tests used by the Second, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. See supra notes 64, 74, 103, 123 and accompanying text (discussing respective cases).
220. This factor is included in the totality tests used by the Third and Tenth Circuits. See supra
notes 64, 103 and accompanying text (discussing respective cases).
221. This factor is included in the totality test used by the Seventh Circuit. See supranote 134
and accompanying text (discussing Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562
(7th Cir. 1995)).
222. This factor is included in the totality test used by the First Circuit. See supra text
accompanying note 148 (discussing Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Dis. Plan, 70 F.2d 173 (1st
Cir. 1995)).
223. See, e.g., Coventry, 856 F.2d at 523-24.
224. See id. at 518, 523.
225. Id.
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be satisfied before a release can be enforced. The essential question is
whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the individual's waiver of her
right can be characterized as 'knowing and voluntary.' 22 6 Similarly, the
Second Circuit has emphasized that "any attempt to ... insist on rigid
adherence to such a list is foreclosed by the very nature of the inquiry. The
'
essential question is a pragmatic one."227
The second significant feature of the totality test is its inclusion of one
group of factors that are entirely within the employer's control and thus
independent of an employee's actions or characteristics.228 These are the
"Employer-Controlled Factors." The totality test includes four of these
factors: (1) whether the waiver language was clear and unambiguous; (2)
whether the waiver was supported by valid consideration; (3) whether the
employer afforded adequate time to the employee to review the waiver
before signing it; and (4) whether the employer advised the employee to
consult with an attorney before signing the waiver. 229 The employer-and
the employer alone-has the responsibility and the ability to satisfy all of
these factors. Without any guesswork or question marks, an employer can
complete these four steps of the totality test in attempting to assemble a
knowing and voluntary waiver.
The third significant feature of the totality test is its inclusion of another
group of factors that are "considerate of the particular individual who has
executed the release., 23" These factors depend solely upon the employee's
actions or personal characteristics and are thus outside of an employer's
control. These are the "Employee-Dependent Factors." Depending on the
version of the totality test, over half of its factors can fall into this group.
The Employee-Dependent Factors include the following: (1) the

226. Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 276 (1st Cir. 2002).
227. Laniok v. Advisory Comm. of Brainerd Mfg. Co. Pension Plan, 935 F.2d 1360, 1368 (2d
Cir. 1991). A related feature of the totality test is that its factors are not "exclusive" or
"exhaustive." See, e.g., Yablon v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan Ret. Plan & Trust, 98 F. App'x 55,
57 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing the "non-exhaustive factors to consider in determining knowledge and
voluntariness" of a waiver); Melanson, 281 F.3d at 276 (using a "non-exclusive set of six factors"
to determine if a waiver is knowing and voluntary); Morais v. Cent. Beverage Corp. Employees'
Supp. Ret. Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 713 & n.6 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that the totality test's factors were
"helpful" but "not exclusive"); Gormin v. Brown-Forman Corp., 963 F.2d 323,327 (1 Ith Cir. 1992)
(noting that "[w]hile this list of factors is not exhaustive, it does provide some guidance for
determining whether a waiver is knowingly and voluntarily executed"); Bormann v. AT&T
Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that the totality test's factors are
"obviously not exhaustive").
Nonetheless, this feature of the totality test is not as significant as its other features, because
the federal circuits typically restrict their evaluation of a waiver to their respective test's
enumerated factors. See supra Part U.C.
228. See, e.g., Coventry, 856 F.2d at 523.
229. See, e.g., id.
230. Id.
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employee's education, business experience, and sophistication; (2)
whether the employee actually consulted with, or was represented, by an
attorney; (3) the role actually taken by the employee in negotiating the
agreement; (4) whether the employee actually knew (or should have
known) his or her rights before signing the waiver; and (5) whether the
employee actually read and considered the waiver before signing it.2 31
The employer does not have the ability to satisfy any of these
Employee-Dependent Factors-the employee does. All of these factors
hinge upon what actions the employee actually takes or does not take and
what characteristics he or she actually possesses or does not possess.
Indeed, Employee-Dependent Factors (1) and (4) (i.e., adequate education,
sophistication, and business experience; and the extent of the employee's
knowledge of his or her legal rights, respectively) are particularly
individualized and vary (whether in small or large degrees) for each and
every employee along education, experience, and knowledge continuums.
B. The ProblematicConsequences Caused by the Totality Test
The totality test's first and third features-namely, its lack of actual
waiver requirements and its Employee-Dependent Factors-represent its
shortcomings because they cause several problematic consequences for
employers, employees, and the courts.
1. The Totality Test's Employee-Dependent Factors Penalize
Good-Faith Employers
Because the totality test's Employee-Dependent Factors are outside of
an employer's control, those factors can, and usually do, inject measurable
uncertainty into the waiver validity issue. These factors (and the
uncertainty that they inherently create) tangibly penalize good-faith
employers-those who take all of the "right" steps within their control to
ensure that a waiver is valid-by undercutting (if not nullifying) their
efforts and forcing them to litigate the waiver issue.
The hypothetical posed in Part I illustrates how the totality test can
penalize a good-faith employer. There, an employer (your company)
discharged an employee and offered the employee severance pay in
exchange for a waiver of federal employment claims. This employer,
acting in good-faith, provided the employee with a crystal-clear waiver,
gave the employee several weeks in which to review the agreement before
signature, advised the employee in writing to consult an attorney before
signature, and provided valid consideration for the waiver.
While this good-faith employer did everything by the book, the

231. See supraPart II.C.
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employee can nonetheless proceed to the nearest federal courthouse or
EEOC office, file one or more of his waived federal employment claims,
and rely upon the uncertainty created by the Employee-Dependent Factors
to challenge the validity of the waiver. Once the employee has argued that
these factors create a material issue of fact so as to avoid summary
judgment, the court has three options: (1) reject the argument and grant
summary judgment to the employer; (2) accept the argument and permit
the waiver issue to proceed to a jury or bench trial; or (3) actually
invalidate the waiver at the summary judgment stage and adjudicate the
underlying employment law action.
Regardless of the lawsuit's result, the totality test has penalized this
good-faith employer; the result of the lawsuit only varies the degree of the
penalty. Under the first option, the good-faith employer wins the case, but
the Employee-Dependent Factors still permitted the employee to create a
justiciable issue as to waiver validity for purposes of summary
judgment. 232 The tangible penalty levied on this employer consists of its
legal expenses to defend the merits of a waiver for which it did everything
perfectly. These legal expenses for the good-faith employer could easily
exceed $30,000.233

232. See, e.g., Nicklin v. Henderson, 352 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
summary judgment to the employer, despite the employee's claim that he "was not offered
counsel"); Melanson, 281 F.3d at 277-78 (affirming summary judgment to the employer, despite
the employee's claim that she "lacked the business acumen" and education to understand and
negotiate the waiver); Morais, 167 F.3d at 713-15 (affirming summary judgment to the employer,
despite the employee's claims that he "was a common laborer with an eighth grade education" and
had not consulted with an attorney prior to signature); Smart v. Gillette Co. Long Term Dis. Plan,
70 F.3d 173, 182 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the employee's
ERISA lawsuit, despite her claims that she "'did not know what ERISA was when she signed the
release; that she did not know that she was releasing any rights under ERISA; and that she did not
intend to release any rights under ERISA"' (quoting Smart v. Gillette Co. Long Term Dis. Plan,
887 F. Supp. 383,385 (D. Mass. 1995))); Adams v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580,583 (6th Cir.
1995) (granting summary judgment to the employer, despite the employee's claim that his
"'extreme economic distress"' forced him to sign his waiver); Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
23 F.3d 930, 935-37 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment to the employer, despite the
employees' claims that they did not "actually" consult with an attorney or negotiate any aspect of
the waiver, and lacked adequate education and business experience to understand the waiver);
Rutledge v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 91-1385, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 18501, at *7-12 (10th
Cir. Aug. 6, 1992) (affirming summary judgment to the employer, despite the employee's claim
that he lacked knowledge of his rights when he signed the waiver); O'Hare v. Global Natural Res.,
Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming summaryjudgmentto the employer, despite
the employee's claim that "stress and anxiety... led him to sign" his waiver); Cirillo v. Arco
Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448, 452-55 (3d Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judgment to the employer,
despite the employee's claim that he misunderstood the scope of the waiver and did not consult
with an attorney prior to signing it).
233. If the lawsuit was settled before the summary judgment stage, then the penalty would also
include
theUF
settlement
costs that the
good-faith2006
employer paid in lieu of further litigation. The 41
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Under the second option (i.e., a trial on the waiver issue), the penalty
is even stiffer for the good-faith employer. There, the employer not only
bears the same legal expenses discussed under the first option but also the
significant costs and expenses to litigate the waiver issue through trial.
These additional, trial-related legal expenses are also variable, but could
easily add another $50,000 (bringing the total expenses to at least
$80,000).
Under the third option (i.e., a trial on the federal employment claim,
because the waiver was invalidated), the good-faith employer would bear
the same legal expenses discussed under the first and second options but
also be forced to litigate the "waived" federal employment claim. Even if
the good-faith employer prevails on that underlying claim, these
additional, trial-related legal expenses (again, perhaps easily exceeding
$50,000 and thereby bringing the total expenses to at least $130,000)
constitute further tangible penalty to this employer.
The Sixth Circuit's Coventry case represents a real example of this
third option and how the totality test can undercut and tangibly penalize
good-faith employers who take the steps within their control to obtain a
valid waiver. In Coventry, United States Steel (USS) seemed to do it
"right"-it prepared a waiver with "clear, specific language," did not
impose any time limit on Hallas to sign the waiver (and in fact allowed
him to have the waiver for the full month prior to his signature), met with
Hallas to discuss the waiver and severance-related options, and provided
valuable consideration to Hallas in exchange for the waiver.234
Despite USS's good-faith efforts, however, Hallas successfully used
certain Employee-Dependent Factors to undercut and, in fact, nullify the
steps taken by USS. 235 Finding that the waiver was not knowing and

voluntary, the Sixth Circuit relied significantly on factors over which USS
had no control, such as (1) Hallas did not in fact consult with an attorney
prior to signing the waiver 236 and (2) Hallas lacked any "meaningful
comprehension of the legal significance" of the waiver because he
"believed that despite the language of the release, he had preserved his
right to challenge the validity of the form. '237 Thus, the totality test
penalized USS more steeply than a typical good-faith employer because
USS bore not only the legal expenses to defend (unsuccessfully) the

foregoing and following figures represent the author's experience in the practice of employment
discrimination litigation.
234. Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 516-17, 524 (3d Cir. 1988).
235. Id. at 524-25.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 525.
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waiver's validity, but also the expenses to litigate Hallas's underlying
ADEA employment claim.238
2. The Totality Test's Lack of Per Se Waiver Requirements
Results in Lessened Waiver Protection for Employees
In addition to penalizing good-faith employers, the totality test
provides inadequate waiver protection for employees who sign (or are
asked to sign) federal employment waivers. The test affords inadequate
protection in two ways.
First, the totality test does not provide any actual waiver-related rights
to employees. For example, the test does not mandate any particular,
concrete period of time for an employee to review the waiver before
signing it, nor does it assure an employee of being advised in writing to
consult with an attorney before signing the waiver. Instead, the totality
test's only guarantee for an employee is that a court will weigh numerous
factors and decide whether, on the whole, a waiver was knowing and
voluntary.239
Second, because "[n]one of the criteria are absolute conditions for
enforceability of the release," 24° the totality test creates a "net sum" game
of arithmetic that does not force bad-faith employers to "do it by the
book." Under the test, if the factors pointing toward a knowing and
voluntary waiver (the "pluses") outweigh (in quantity or quality) those that
do not (the "minuses"), then the net positive sum translates into a valid
waiver."
238. Torrez is another good example of how the totality test's Employee-Dependent Factors
can penalize a good-faith employer by calling into question a waiver's validity even when the
employer had done it "right." Torrez v. Pub. Serv. Co., 908 F.2d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 1990). There,
Public Service Company (the employer) prepared a waiver that was "clear and unambiguous,"
provided Torrez (the employee) with a thirty day window in which to review and sign the waiver,
and provided several months of severance pay to Torrez in exchange for the signed waiver. Id. at
688-90. However, the Tenth Circuit significantly relied upon the totality test's EmployeeDependent Factors to find a material issue of fact on the knowing and voluntary standard and thus
remanded the case for trial. Id. at 690. These Employee-Dependent Factors included: (1) Torrez
was a "high school educated employee, unfamiliar with the law" who did not know he was waiving
possible discrimination claims when he signed the waiver, but instead "believed" that he was
releasing only other claims and (2) Torrez had not consulted with an attorney before signing the
waiver. Id.
239. See supra Part lI.C.
240. Parisis G. Filippatos & Sean Farhang, The Rights of Employees Subjected to Reductions
in Force: A CriticalEvaluation,6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.263, 305 (2002).
241. For examples of how courts perform this "plus-minus" calculation, see Bormann v.
AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399,403 n.1 (2dCir. 1989) (noting that plaintiffs "apparently did
not have an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the waiver, which is one of the issues relevant to
whether the release was signed knowingly and willfully" and concluding that "this fact alone [did
not] require[] a trial" on the knowing and voluntary issue because the "other indicia" made
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Because "failures by an employer to satisfy one factor are often
overlooked based upon [its] satisfaction of another factor," 24 2 however, the
net sum game of arithmetic performed under the totality test affords badfaith employers the opportunity, if not the motivation, to satisfy some, but
not all, of the factors that are within their control. After all, these
employers understand that the test is a net sum game in which not all of
the factors need to be "pluses." Other commentators have similarly
observed that the totality test "provides inadequate incentive for employers
to observe high standards of compliance with all the elements recognized
to contribute to the knowing and voluntary character of a release. Rather,
employers may infer.., that a series of243half measures, weighed together,
will be sufficient to sustain a release.
Certainly, the totality test is designed to catch a bad-faith employer that
receives the wrong message from the totality test's net sum game of
arithmetic and then takes mere half measures. However, the test can only
catch that employer if the employee-who has signed the waiver-sues
the employer under a "waived" federal employment claim and seeks to
invalidate the waiver. If that employee never sues, then the bad-faith
employer may continue to utilize its half-measures, or even reduced
quarter-measures, when attempting to obtain waivers from other
employees. Thus, the totality test's use of a net sum game of arithmetic
(rather than per se waiver protections) does a particularly poor job of
protecting non-litigious employees from bad-faith employers.
3. The Totality Test's Employee-Dependent Factors Perpetuate
Waiver-Related Litigation That Clogs Judicial Dockets
Not only is the totality test problematic for employers and employees,
but it also negatively impacts the courts and their dockets because the
test's case-by-case approach encourages waiver litigation. Under the
totality test, "no single fact or circumstance is entitled to talismanic
significance on the question of waiver. '"2' Instead, each legal challenge to
a federal employment waiver under the totality test "is sui
generis... [and] a fact-intensive exercise"245 because the test lacks any
actual waiver requirements and contains several Employee-Dependent
"unmistakably clear that [the plaintiffs] were aware that they were giving up 'important rights');
Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., 862 F.2d 448,452-55 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that the plaintiff had neither
consulted with an attorney prior to signing the waiver nor negotiated any aspects of the waiver and
concluding that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because the other totality test factors had
been satisfied and thus tipped the balance).
242. Filippatos & Farhang, supra note 240, at 305.
243. Id. at 305-06.
244. Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Dis. Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 1995).
245. Id. at 181-82.
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Factors. Thus, courts using the totality test apply the "indicia of knowing
and voluntary waivers... in an ad hoc fashion." 2'
In enacting the OWBPA, Congress recognized both the totality test's
ad hoc approach and the problems that this approach created. Specifically,
Congress noted that the totality test scrutinized "many different factors or
criteria on a case-by-case basis" rather than requiring that "certain
protective factors must be present." 247 In addition, Congress viewed the
uncertainty and unpredictability created by the totality test as only
"promising more litigation in the future. 248 In response, Congress
designed the OWBPA' s requirements to "spell out clear and ascertainable
standards" for ADEA waivers so as to "clarify an unsettled area of the law
and reverse a disturbing trend of litigation concerning ADEA waivers."249
While the OWBPA effected solutions to these problems for ADEA
waivers, the totality test still perpetuates a similar "disturbing trend of
litigation" as to non-ADEA waivers. 250 Its case-by-case approach creates
the uncertainty and unpredictability that can permit, if not encourage,
employees to mount legal challenges to legitimate knowing and voluntary
waivers. Even if these employees lose their waiver challenges, the impact
on the judicial systems and their dockets has already been realized because
those courts have had to devote resources to adjudicating the waiver
challenges.
4. The Totality Test Leads Cost-Conscious Employers to Reduce
Severance Benefits for Employees
In addition to burdening the judicial system, the waiver-related
litigation stemming from the totality test can also have tangible
consequences for employees, as cost-conscious employers will likely
reduce the amount of employee severance benefits by anticipated waiverrelated legal expenses.
For example, suppose a company has, on separate occasions,
terminated two groups often employees and offered $10,000 (equal to two
months' pay) to each employee in exchange for a signed waiver of all
federal employment claims. All ten employees in each group initially sign
the waivers, but one of the employees from each group later decides to
challenge the validity of the waiver (relying on the totality test's
Employee-Dependent Factors) and assert an otherwise waived Title VII or
ADA discrimination claim against the company. However, both employees

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Filippatos & Farhang, supra note 240, at 305.
House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 50, 51.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50.
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are unsuccessful in arguing that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary
under the totality test, and the district court grants summary judgment in
favor of the company in each lawsuit. The legal expenses of the company
through summary judgment total $50,000 for each lawsuit.
In this example, the company has two sets of costs for each of the
group terminations: (1) the severance benefits provided to each group's ten
employees in exchange for the waivers (totaling $100,000 for each group)
and (2) its legal expenses to defend each of the waiver lawsuits ($50,000
for each group). When the company terminates a third group of ten
employees (for example), will it provide each of the employees the same
$10,000 amount that had been offered to each employee in the prior two
groups? Although it might choose to do so, the company, if seeking to
keep the costs of a group termination static, is likely to reduce the
severance pay offered to those in the third group so as to compensate for
the anticipated $50,000 in legal expenses that will result from another
waiver-related legal challenge. If the company makes this choice, it would
reduce the total group severance benefits to $50,000 (or, $5,000 per
employee), which is half of the $100,000 amount that had been provided
to each of the prior two groups. Thus, each employee would be offered
half of what he or she otherwise would have received.
Of course, the company still must provide an adequate monetary
incentive to the third employee group if it wants those employees to sign
the waivers. Nonetheless, the example illustrates how the litigation that
results from the totality test's inherent uncertainty likely causes long-term
economic loss to employees when employers use waiver-related litigation
costs to reduce employee severance benefits.251
C. The Totality Test's Inconsistency with the Congressional
Waiver Approach Embodied in the OWBPA
In addition to creating problematic consequences for employers,
employees, and the courts, the totality test's lack of per se waiver
requirements and inclusion of Employee-Dependent Factors are
inconsistent with the congressionally-preferred waiver approach contained

251. If the totality test generates enough waiver-related litigation for a cost-conscious
employer, then this employer could opt to eliminate severance benefits. In the above example,
suppose that five employees in each of the first two groups decide to challenge their respective
waivers and sue the company on the basis of waived-claims. Even if the company prevails on all
of the cases at summary judgment, the legal expenses for the five lawsuits from each group could
easily exceed the $100,000 in total severance benefits that were provided to that group. If and when
the company terminates a third group of employees, it could rationally conclude that, because it is
likely to get sued by several employees and spend more than $100,000 in litigation costs anyway,
it will not offer any severance benefits and will just litigate any arising cases.
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in the OWBPA. Indeed, Congress enacted the OWBPA to create a waiver
approach that excluded these two features. 2
While the OWBPA expressly applies only to ADEA waivers, it is the
only federal employment waiver legislation ever passed by Congress. As
a result, the OWBPA can be helpful in evaluating the totality test because
it provides exclusive insight into the waiver approach that Congress
preferred and the reasons for that preference.
1. The Two Features of the OWBPA's Waiver Approach
The OWBPA's approach to ADEA waivers has two significant
features. The first feature is that the OWBPA sets forth "threshold
requirements for judicial consideration of a waiver of rights" under the
ADEA.253 If any one of the seven basic requirements is not satisfied, then
the ADEA waiver is not knowing and voluntary.254
The second feature of the OWBPA is that all of its waiver requirements
are within the employer's control rather than dependent upon the
employee. 5 Because the OWBPA's instruction booklet assigns all
waiver-related tasks to the employer, 256 an OWBPA-compliant waiver is
the quintessential do-it-yourself project for an employer. So, if an
employer wants a waiver to cover ADEA claims, then the employer-and
only the employer-has the responsibility and the ability to meet each of
the clear requirements for an OWBPA-compliant waiver: (1) to word the
waiver in a clear manner; (2) to include ADEA claims expressly; (3) not
to cover prospective ADEA claims in the waiver; (4) to provide severance
pay (or other consideration) as valid consideration for the waiver; (5) to
advise the employee to consult with a lawyer; and (6) to afford a three
week review period and a one week revocation period. 257 The OWBPA's

252. See infra Part IV.C.2.
253. Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 6.
254. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990) (codified in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623,
626, 630 (2000)).
255. See id. at 983-84.
256. See id.
257. Id. One could argue that the first OWBPA requirement-that the waiver be "written in
a manner calculated to be understood" by the employee or "the average individual eligible to
participate" in the severance package or program-is outside of the employer's control because it
depends on whether the employee, or "the average individual," actually understands the waiver.
Id. at 983. However, this argument reads too much into the first requirement by improperly
equating, or at least confusing, the "manner" in which the waiver is written (which is within an
employer's control) with the employee's actual understanding of the waiver (which is not within
an employer's control).
The OWBPA demands only that the employer use waiver language that is intended and
"calculated" to be understood by the average person. Id. It does not demand that the person actually
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instruction booklet does not include any employee-dependent waiver
requirements that would partially place the fate of the employer's waiver
project in the hands of an employee.258
These two features of the OWBPA were not coincidence; rather, the
OWBPA's legislative history shows that Congress purposefully opted for
waiver requirements (in lieu of mere criteria) and preferred requirements
that were "clear and ascertainable" for the employers who would be
obliged to satisfy them.259 Although Congress viewed the totality test as
being "more thorough" than the "cursory" pure contract-based approach,
it also felt that the totality test was problematic because it analyzed "many
different factors or criteria on a case-by-case basis, in effect promising
more litigation in the future .,,2' As a solution to these problems, Congress
designed the OWBPA to "spell out clear and ascertainable standards" for
ADEA waivers and thus "clarify an unsettled area of the law and reverse
a disturbing trend of litigation concerning ADEA waivers. ' '261
2. The Totality Test's Failure to Embody the Features
of the OWBPA's Waiver Approach
As discussed in Part IV.A, the totality test has three significant
features: (1) its lack of per se waiver requirements; (2) its use of some
factors that are solely within the employer's control; and (3) its use of
other factors that solely depend upon the employee. Only the second
feature is consistent with the OWBPA's262
waiver approach and philosophy;
the first and third features contradict it.
understand the waiver's language or that a court look at the person's education, business
experience, or sophistication to determine if they understood, or likely understood, the waiver's
language. Indeed, none of the OWBPA requirements hinges on any of an employee's personal
characteristics. See id.
258. The employer-controlled feature of the OWBPA's main requirements also extends to its
modified requirements for ADEA waivers in special contexts. For example, when an ADEA waiver
is obtained as a result of a "group or class" termination program, the OWBPA expands the review
period to forty-five days and requires certain job title and age information to be provided to the
affected employees. Id. These two additional requirements are solely within the employer's control
and are simply extra steps contained in the OWBPA's instruction booklet.
In addition, the OWBPA lessens slightly the standard requirements for a waiver of an ADEA
claim that has already been filed in court or with the EEOC, by eliminating the revocation right and
requiring only a "reasonable period of time" for an employee to review the waiver. Id. at 984.
Providing this reduced review period remains within the employer's control.
259. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 50, 51.
260. Id.
261. Id. Like the OWBPA, the Waiver Protection Act also used per se waiver requirements
that were within an employer's control. This congressional consistency further contradicts
coincidence and evidences actual preference. See supra note 179 and accompanying text
(discussing the Waiver Protection Act's requirements).
262. See House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 50, 51; see also supra Part IV.A.
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The totality test's first feature runs counter to the OWBPA's waiver
approach. In enacting the OWBPA, Congress expressly rejected a waiver
approach that included "many different factors or criteria" to be analyzed
'
and instead intentionally chose one that set
on "a case-by-case basis"263
forth actual per se waiver requirements. Yet, the totality test makes the
opposite choice. 264 It merely sets forth a pool of waiver factors, none of
which is necessarily required for a valid waiver but each of which figures
into the totality test's net sum game of arithmetic.265
In contrast, the totality test's second feature-use of employercontrolled criteria-is consistent with the OWBPA's waiver philosophy.
The test's Employer-Controlled Factors are compatible with Congress's
purposeful choice of waiver requirements that were "clear and
ascertainable" to the employers who would have to satisfy them. 266 Indeed,
the totality test's four Employer-Controlled Factors-clear and
unambiguous waiver language, valid consideration, advice to consult with
legal counsel, and an adequate waiver review period 267 -are essentially the
same as the following four OWBPA requirements: (1) that the waiver be
written in an understandable manner; (2) that the waiver be supported by
valuable consideration; (3) that the employer advise the employee in
writing to consult with an attorney before signing the waiver; and (4) that
the employer give the employee adequate time-specifically, at least
twenty-one days-to review the waiver.2 68 These four common waiver
criteria will ultimately comprise the new Waiver Certainty Test proposed
in Part V.
Like the totality test's first feature, its third feature-use of employeedependent criteria-also runs counter to the OWBPA's waiver approach.
The OWBPA contains no waiver requirements that are compatible with the
test's Employee-Dependent Factors. The OWBPA requirements do not
take into account whether an employee actually (1) has adequate
education, experience, and sophistication; 269 (2) retains an attorney to
review the waiver; 27 ° (3) tries to negotiate, or succeeds in negotiating, the
terms of the waiver; (4) knows his or her legal rights; or (5) reads the
waiver before signing it. When Congress criticized the totality test by
263. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 50, 51.
264. See id.; supra Part IV.A.
265. See supra Part IV.A.
266. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 50, 51.
267. See supra Parts II.C, IV.A.
268. See supra notes 190-96, 257 and accompanying text.
269. In enacting the OWBPA, Congress even stated that the waiver language should be
"readily understandable... regardless of [an employee's] education or business experience."
House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 50, 51 (emphasis added).
270. In enacting the OWBPA, Congress acknowledged that an employee "cannot be required
to hire an attorney before signing a waiver." Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

49

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 2
FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

saying that the test's analysis of "many different factors or criteria"
promoted a "case-by-case" approach that "promis[ed] more litigation in
the future," 27 ' Congress's criticism was directed at the test's EmployeeDependent Factors because those are the factors that create the legal
guesswork and uncertainty within the test's ad hoc approach.
One could argue that, despite its criticism of the totality test, Congress
did express "support"27' 2 for it in the OWBPA's legislative history.
However, this argument incorrectly assumes that relative preference for
the whole automatically equals absolute preference for the parts. For
example, suppose Robert invites Shirley to a pizza party. Robert serves
two pizzas: the first with pepperoni, extra cheese, anchovies, black olives,
mushrooms, and sweet peppers; and the second with sausage, green
peppers, ham, and pineapple. After eating both pizzas, Shirley tells Robert
that she likes and prefers the first pizza over the second.
Does that mean that Shirley likes the first pizza over all other pizzas?
Not necessarily. At a minimum, Shirley means what she says-that she
liked the first pizza better than the second pizza (relative preference for the
whole). But, Shirley's stated preference does not necessarily mean that she
liked the first pizza's ingredient combination better than all other possible
pizza ingredient combinations (absolute preference for the parts).
Similarly, in enacting the OWBPA, Congress commented on the two
approaches that the federal circuits had used to determine if a waiver was
knowing and voluntary-the "ordinary contract principles approach" and
the "'totality of circumstances' approach."273 In evaluating the two,
Congress felt that the former was "cursory" while the latter was "more
' Consequently, it stated that it favored,
thorough" and "more protective."274
or "support[ed]," the totality test over the pure contract-based approach. 2 "
Like Shirley's statement that she liked the first pizza better than the
second, Congress at a minimum meant what it said: that it preferred the
totality test over the pure contract-based approach (relative preference for
the whole). But, Congress's stated preference does not necessarily mean
that it preferred the totality test's "ingredient combination" (its features
and factors) over all other possible waiver approach "ingredient
combinations" (absolute preference for the parts).
So, how can one tell if Shirley and Congress were expressing absolute
preference for the parts? As to Shirley, at least one way is to see what
ingredients she uses on her own pizza when she cooks pizza for herself. If
Shirley makes a pizza with the same ingredients as Robert's first pizza,

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. at 26, 51.
See supra text accompanying note 203.
House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 26, 51.
Id.
Id. at 50, 51.
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then her relative preference for the whole equaled absolute preference for
the parts. But, if Shirley makes her own pizza with only some, but not all,
of the ingredients from Robert's first pizza, then her preference for
Robert's first pizza was relative for the whole but not absolute for the
parts.
Similarly, one can look to see what types of waiver approach features
and requirements Congress used when it enacted the OWBPA. If Congress
had used the same features and factors for the OWBPA as those from the
totality test, then its relative preference and "support" for the totality test
would have equaled absolute preference for the totality test's "ingredient
combination." But, in building its own waiver approach, Congress used
only some of the totality test's ingredients. It only included requirements
that were within the control of an employer-just like the totality test's
four Employer-Controlled Factors.276 However, Congress excluded the
totality test's other two features-the use of waiver factors in lieu of per
se requirements, and the use of waiver criteria that rely solely on the
employee and are outside of an employer's control. 7
Thus, while it is true that Congress preferred the totality test over a
pure contact-based approach, that relative preference for the whole cannot
be viewed as an absolute preference and endorsement of all of the totality
test's parts. If Congress did have that absolute preference, it either would
have found it unnecessary to legislate in the area or would have legislated
waiver requirements that mirrored the factors of the totality test (which
certain courts were using at the time). 78 Congress did neither.
In addition, one could argue that Congress's use of only employercontrolled requirements in the OWBPA does not evidence an intent to
exclude employee-dependent criteria altogether, because Congress
intended the OWBPA to set forth necessary, but not sufficient, conditions
for a knowing and voluntary ADEA waiver. This argument primarily
stems from the OWBPA's language that an ADEA waiver "may not be
considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum" the specified
requirements are met.27 9 As other commentators have recognized, the "at
a minimum" language could "suggest[] that the statutory requirements
may be necessary, but' not
sufficient in every case to establish a knowing
280
and voluntary waiver.

276. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C.
277. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.C.1.
278. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 26, 51.
279. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990) (codified in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 626,
630 (2000)).
280. Robert A. LaBerge and Thomas G. Eron, Employment Law, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 295,
325 (1992); see also Jan W. Henkel, Waiver of Claims Under the Age Discrimination in
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The limited number of federal district and circuit courts that have
addressed this issue disagree on whether the OWBPA's requirements are
the be-all-end-all for purposes of the knowing and voluntary standard for
ADEA waivers. 1 However, interpretation of the "at a minimum"

Employment Act After Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 415
(2000) (discussing the view that the "provisions of the OWBPA are only minimum requirements
and, therefore, a court may find that in some circumstances simply meeting these minimal standards
is inadequate .... Since the OWBPA is only a threshold requirement and other circumstances may
shed light on the validity of a waiver, certainly situations will exist in which the minimum
requirements are met but the waiver is not considered knowing and voluntary"). Similarly, the
"may not be considered" language, see supra text accompanying note 189, could be interpreted as
only permissive in nature (may be knowing and voluntary) rather than mandatory (will be knowing
and voluntary). If Congress had intended the language to be mandatory, the argument could go,
then it would have expressly stated that an ADEA waiver "will be considered knowing and
voluntary if and only if it meets the following minimum requirements."
Proponents of this interpretation of the OWBPA may also point to certain portions of the
OWBPA's legislative history. For example, in the Senate's Labor and Human Resources
Committee's report on the OWBPA, the Committee appeared to differentiate between the
OWBPA's "specified minimum requirements" and the "independent" requirement that a waiver
be "knowing and voluntary." See Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 32 (noting that the
OWBPA "establishes specified minimum requirements that must be satisfied before a court may
proceed to determine factually whether the execution of a waiver was 'knowing and voluntary"');
see also id. at 31 (suggesting that ADEA waivers could be valid "if they meet certain threshold
requirements [under the OWBPA] and are otherwise shown to be knowing and voluntary").
281. Some courts have concluded that the OWBPA's requirements are not the end of the
knowing and voluntary inquiry for ADEA waivers. See Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health Network,
342 F.3d 281,294 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003) (referencing the totality test for the "knowing and voluntary"
requirement and concluding that "general considerations that bear on the issue, apart from the
statutory prerequisites [of the OWBPA], are relevant"); Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d
1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that courts "must look beyond the specified [OWBPA]
statutory minimum requirements" to the "totality of the circumstances" and holding that "nonstatutory circumstances such as fraud, duress, or mutual mistake may render an ADEA waiver not
'knowing and voluntary' under the OWBPA"); Griffin v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368,37374 (11 th Cir. 1995) (finding that the circumstances considered in prior totality test cases "survive"
the OWBPA and holding that "nonstatutory circumstances, such as fraud, duress, or coercion in
connection with the execution of the waiver, may render an ADEA waiver not 'knowing and
voluntary"'); Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1243 (D. Kan. 2002)
(following Bennett and stating that "[e]ven assuming that the waivers ... comply with the specific
express requirements of the OWBPA, those releases are nonetheless not valid unless they are
otherwise knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances"); EEOC v. Johnson &
Higgins, 5 F. Supp. 2d 181, 183, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that any evaluation of an ADEA
waiver "must start first" with the OWBPA but would also be "guided" by the totality test, and then
concluding that-even if the plaintiff had received adequate consideration so as to meet the only
contested OWBPA requirement-a material issue of fact existed "as to whether these waivers were
signed knowingly and voluntarily or under coercion"); cf.Dorn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 131 F. App'x
462, 468 (6th Cir. 2005) (analyzing the plantiff's ADEA waiver under the totality test, though not
expressly addressing the OWBPA's effect on the totality test); Bachiller v. Turn On Prods., Inc.,
86 F. App'x 465, 467 (2d Cir. 2004) (same).
While the Bennett and Thiessen courts did look beyond the OWBPA's requirements in
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/2
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language to mean that the OWBPA sets forth only necessary conditions for
a knowing and voluntary ADEA waiver (and that the totality test thus still
applies to that waiver) is unsound for several reasons.
First, this interpretation significantly frustrates the OWBPA's goal of
reducing ADEA waiver litigation through use of "clear and ascertainable
standards. 282 At least in part, the OWBPA was Congress's response to the
uncertainty that surrounded ADEA waivers and the spike in legal
challenges that emanated from that uncertainty. Congress rebuffed the
totality test's "case-by-case" approach because the test involved "many
different factors or criteria" that "promis[ed] more litigation in the
future., 283 Consequently, Congress designed the OWBPA with the goal of
"spell[ing] out clear and ascertainable standards" that would "clarify"
the
law on ADEA waivers and "reverse a disturbing trend of litigation., ' 28 If
the courts in totality test jurisdictions continue to apply that test and its
many Employee-Dependent Factors to ADEA waivers (in addition to the
OWBPA requirements), then the uncertainty that Congress attempted to
eliminate would return. Simply put, the OWBPA could not be the solution
that Congress intended, because the waiver waters would once again
285
become muddied by the uncertainty created by the totality test.

evaluating the ADEA waivers in those cases, they did not apply the totality test to those waivers;
instead, they considered state law contract defenses (such as fraud, duress, and/or mutual mistake)
as the "non-statutory circumstances" that remained applicable to ADEA waivers. See Bennett, 189
F.3d at 1228-29; Thiessen, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1243-44. This point-whether state contract law
defenses still apply to ADEA waivers after the OWBPA-is different than whether the "knowing
and voluntary" totality test survived the OWBPA. Congress did appear to contemplate the survival
of these state contract law defenses, as it noted that an employee signing an ADEA waiver "also
must have acted in the absence of fraud, duress, coercion, or mistake of material fact." Senate
OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 32; House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 50, 51.
Conversely, other courts have concluded that the OWBPA's requirements are the end of the
knowing and voluntary inquiry for ADEA waivers. See Riddell v. Med. Inter-Insurance Exch., 18
F. Supp. 2d 468,471 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating that the "'totality of the circumstances' test" has been
"superceded by the OWBPA with respect to releases of ADEA claims"); Reid v. IBM Corp., No.
95 Civ. 1755 (MBM), 1997 WL 357969, at *3-6 (S.D.N.Y. June 26,1997) (using only the OWBPA
to evaluate the plaintiffs waiver of ADEA claims and the totality test to evaluate his waiver of
Title VII and ADA claims); cf. Thomforde v. IBM, 406 F.3d 500, 504, 505 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005)
(noting that the court "need not decide the proper test to apply to determine whether the [ADEA]
waiver was also knowing and voluntary" (because the waiver had not even met the OWBPA's
requirements) and thus "leav[ing] that discussion for another day"). In Reid, although the district
court did not use the totality test to evaluate the plaintiffs ADEA waiver, it stated that a plaintiff
may challenge an ADEA waiver by raising "other defenses to a release, such as duress and
incapacity, which might show that he did not enter the release knowingly and voluntarily." Reid,
1997 WL 357969, at *6.
282. See supra text accompanying note 206.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 204-05.
284. See supra text accompanying note 206.
285. Other OWBPA provisions and certain changes from the language of the Waiver
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In addition, language from the Supreme Court's decision in Oubre v.
Entergy Operations,Inc.286 supports the view that the OWBPA displaces
(rather than merely supplements) any additional analysis of whether an
ADEA waiver is "knowing and voluntary." While Oubre dealt with a
different issue, some of the opinions tangentially discussed the role of the
OWBPA in determining whether an ADEA waiver is knowing and
voluntary.
In a six to three decision, the Oubre Court held that the common law
contract doctrines of tender back and ratification cannot be used to convert
a non-OWBPA-compliant waiver into an effective bar to an ADEA
lawsuit. 87 While Justice Thomas dissented because neither the OWBPA
nor its legislative history evidenced an intent to displace these common
law contract doctrines, his opinion also commented on the OWBPA's
relationship to the "knowing and voluntary" requirement for ADEA
waivers:
The only clear and explicit purpose of the OWBPA is to
define "knowing and voluntary" in the context of ADEA
waivers. Prior to the statute's enactment, the Courts of
Appeals had disagreed about the proper standard for
Protection Act also run counter to the view that the OWBPA does not set forth the entire test for
knowing and voluntary ADEA waivers. For example, in allocating burden of proof under the
OWBPA, Congress provided that "the party asserting the validity of a waiver shall have the burden
of proving... that a waiver was knowing and voluntary pursuant to [the OWBPA's requirements]."
29 U.S.C. § 626(0(3) (2000). If Congress had intended that the OWBPA's requirements were only
necessary rather than sufficient, then there would have been no need to even mention "knowing and
voluntary" in the burden of proof section; instead, Congress could have limited the section to the
burden of proving that the OWBPA's particular requirements were met. See LaBerge and Eron,
supra note 280, at 325-26 (stating that "[i]t is unlikely that Congress contemplated the possibility
of additional elements for a valid waiver without accommodating that possibility in the burden of
proof provision").
In addition, the Waiver Protection Act would have permitted a waiver of a "bona fide claim"
under the ADEA "only if the waiver is knowing and voluntary and only if" certain enumerated
requirements were met. S. 54, 101st Cong. § 2 (1989) (emphasis added); H.R. 1432, 101st Cong.
§ 2 (1989) (emphasis added). Use of the conjunctive "and" might suggest that Congress viewed the
knowing and voluntary requirement as additional to the Waiver Protection Act's requirements.
However, Congress used different language in the OWBPA, which provides that a waiver may not
be considered "knowing and voluntary unless" the specified minimum requirements are met. 29
U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2000). Deletion of the conjunctive suggests that a waiver is knowing and
voluntary as long as it meets the OWBPA's requirements.
286. 522 U.S. 422 (1988).
287. id. at 424, 428. The Court reasoned that the OWBPA imposed a "strict, unqualified
statutory stricture on waivers" and that it disallowed any ADEA waivers "without qualification"
unless "the employer complies with the statute." Id. at 427. Because Oubre's waiver did not comply
with the OWBPA's requirements, the Court felt that allowing use of the common law contract
doctrines would give effect to "that which Congress forbids" and "would frustrate the statute's
practical operation as well as its formal command." Id.
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determining whether such waivers were knowing and
voluntary. Several courts had adopted a "totality of the
circumstances" test as a matter of federal waiver
law.... [O]thers had relied solely on common-law contract
principles ....In enacting the OWBPA, Congress adopted
neither approach, instead setting certain minimum
requirements that every release of ADEA rights and claims
must meet in order to be deemed knowing and voluntary. I
thereforeagreewith the Courtthat the OWBPA abrogatesthe
common-law definition of a "knowing and voluntary" waiver
where ADEA claims are involved.288
Although Justice Kennedy's majority opinion did not address this precise
issue with as much clarity as Justice Thomas's dissent, it also appeared to
take a broad, quasi-preemptive view of the OWBPA by noting that the
OWBPA "set[] up its own regime for assessing the effect of ADEA
waivers, separate and apart from contract law," "create[d] a series of
prerequisites for knowing and voluntary waivers," and "govern[ed] the
effect under federal law of waivers or releases on ADEA claims. 289
Nonetheless, even if Congress had viewed the OWBPA as merely
supplementing the totality test (in relevant jurisdictions) to determine
whether an ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary, the resulting "dual
test" would serve only to reiterate the need for reform in the ADEA waiver
arena as well. For example, suppose an employer meets all of the
OWBPA's requirements for obtaining a valid ADEA waiver from an
employee. It words the waiver clearly, expressly mentions the ADEA in
a non-prospective waiver section, affords the employee three weeks to
review the waiver and seven days to revoke it after it has been signed,
advises the employee to consult with an attorney, and provides valid
consideration for the waiver. It is difficult to see how that employee's
waiver could be anything other than knowing and voluntary. Nonetheless,
a dual test leaves that door open because the OWBPA's requirements are
viewed as insufficient. As a result, the employee would have the
opportunity to challenge the waiver under the totality
test by focusing only on the Employee-Dependent Factors (because the
test's four Employer-Controlled Factors would have been satisfied via
OWBPA compliance).
In this example, the totality test component of the dual test would
penalize the good-faith employer by forcing that employer into a costly
(albeit likely successful) defense of the waiver's validity.29 Indeed,
288. Id. at 436 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
289. Id. at 427 (majority opinion).
290. For the employer in Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 342 F.3d 281 (3d Cir.
2003), this
example
became a reality.
In that case,
Wastak signed an ADEA waiver that complied 55
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because the dual test would contain the totality test component, the totality
test's other above-referenced problematic consequences in the non-ADEA
waiver area would extend to ADEA waivers as well. These other
consequences would include (1) perpetuating ADEA waiver litigation
within the federal courts and (2) steering cost-conscious employers to
offset severance benefits for employees by anticipated ADEA waiverrelated litigation costs.
V. THE WAIVER CERTAINTY TEST PROPOSED
Due to the totality test's shortcomings and problematic consequences
for employers, employees, and the courts, a new and reformed analysis is
needed to determine whether a waiver of non-ADEA federal employment
claims is knowing and voluntary. The new test proposed in this
Article-the Waiver Certainty Test--eliminates the totality test's two
shortcomings, is consistent with the congressional waiver approach
embodied in the OWBPA, and avoids the four problematic consequences
that result from the totality test.
A. The Waiver Certainty Test's Requirements and Features
The Waiver Certainty Test contains four requirements for a waiver of
non-ADEA federal employment claims to be knowing and voluntary.
These four requirements are:
(1) the waiver language must be clear and unambiguous;
(2) the waiver must be supported by valuable consideration
provided to the employee;
(3) the employer must advise the employee in writing to
consult with an attorney before signing the waiver; and
(4) the employer must provide the employee at least twentyone days in which to review the waiver before signing it.
As a result, the Waiver Certainty Test has two significant features.
First, it takes the extra step of providing per se waiver requirements that
guarantee employees relevant waiver rights and protections. While "[iut is

with all of the OWBPA's relevant requirements. Id. at 288. Undeterred, however, Wastak argued
that "the Release violated the general principles of the OWBPA in that, regardless of whether it
satisfied the specific minimum requirements set forth in [the OWBPA], it was not made knowingly
and voluntarily." Id. at 294. Primarily relying upon two of the totality test's Employee-Dependent
Factors, Wastak claimed that "he was unable to secure counsel to review the relevant documents"
and "he did not understand the nature and content of the Release." Id. Although the Third Circuit
rejected these arguments and concluded that Wastak's waiver was knowing and voluntary, it
evaluated the waiver under the totality test in addition to the OWBPA's requirements. Id. at 294
n.8.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/2
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not necessary [under the totality test] that each [factor] be satisfied before
a release can be enforced," 291 a waiver will be deemed knowing and
voluntary under this new test if and only if each of the four requirements
is satisfied.
Second, each of the Waiver Certainty Test's requirements is within the
control of the employer and not dependent upon the employee. The
employer has both the sole responsibility and the ability to meet the four
requirements. Unlike many of the totality test's factors, the new test's
factors involve no guesswork by the employer based on what an employee
does or does not do, or based on a characteristic that an employee
possesses or does not possess.
Consequently, the Waiver Certainty Test retains only one feature of the
totality test-its use of Employer-Controlled Factors (albeit converting
them into requirements). Indeed, this new test pulls its requirements
directly from the four Employer-Controlled Factors contained in the
totality test. However, because the totality test does not specify a precise
waiver review period that an employer must provide an employee, the
twenty-one day timeframe is borrowed from the OWBPA.292
While retaining one of the totality test's features, the new test discards
the two features that represent the totality test's shortcomings: (1) its use
of non-mandatory factors, or indicia, of a knowing and voluntary waiver
and (2) its use of Employee-Dependent Factors that are "considerate of the
particular individual who has executed the release. 29 3
B. The Waiver Certainty Test Is Consistent with the Congressional
Waiver Approach Embodied in the OWBPA
While the totality test has features inconsistent with those of the
congressionally-preferred waiver approach in the OWBPA, the Waiver
Certainty Test and the OWBPA share the same two features: (1) imposing
per se waiver requirements and rights (albeit not identical) and (2) limiting
these requirements to those that are within the control of the employer.
Like the OWBPA, this new test purposefully opts for standards that are
"clear and ascertainable" for the employers who are charged with
satisfying them. Further, it rejects having a pool of "different factors or
criteria" that generates an uncertain "case-by-case" approach. 294
Because of their shared features, both the Waiver Certainty Test and
the OWBPA provide a step-by-step instruction booklet for an employer to

291. Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272, 276 (1st Cir. 2002).
292. For a response to the argument that the time period should be less than the OWBPA's
twenty-one day timeframe, see infra note 307.
293. Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 523 (3d Cir. 1988).
294.byHouse
OWBPA
Report,Repository,
supra note 169,
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assemble a knowing and voluntary waiver. In contrast to a waiver under
the totality test, waivers under both the new test and the OWBPA are do-ityourself projects for employers that do not involve any step that is
employee-dependent or variable.
One could argue that the OWBPA's requirements, in their entirety,
should simply serve as the knowing and voluntary test for non-ADEA
waivers, so that the test for all federal employment waivers would be
uniform. Other commentators have argued for this reform.2 95 Of course,
use of a uniform OWBPA-based test for all federal employment waivers
would embody the two waiver approach features that the totality test
currently lacks-namely, per se waiver requirements that also are within
an employer's control. In that respect, a uniform OWBPA-based test and
the Waiver Certainty Test would share the same positive attribute.
However, a uniform OWBPA-based test would be inconsistent with the
congressional purpose and intent expressed in the OWBPA's legislative
history. Despite criticism that "older workers should be treated no
differently from the minority and female workers who are protected
against employment discrimination under Title VlI,"2 6 Congress
purposefully enacted the OWBPA to provide different, more stringent
waiver protections for older workers.2 97 In support of this disparate
treatment, Congress viewed older workers-unlike workers in other
protected classes-as uniquely susceptible to "be[ing] manipulated or even
coerced" into waiving their rights298 because, in part, they were often the
targets of large scale "group termination programs" in which age

295. See Filippatos & Farhang, supra note 240, at 264-65, 297 (arguing that the OWBPA
"provide[s] far more robust protection to employee rights than the common law doctrines applied
to the release of employment claims outside the age discrimination context" and that "there is no
principled reason for providing less protection to individuals asked to release Title VII and ADA
claims as compared with ADEA claims. Accordingly, we .. .suggest[] that the regime of
employment discrimination law be made consistent by extending application of the OWBPA
release requirements to Title VII and ADA claims."); Henkel, supra note 280, at 420 (stating that
"although the [OWBPA] was enacted pursuant to the ADEA, Congress might have intended to
define 'knowing and voluntary' for all federal employment discrimination statutes or at least those
the validity of waivers of which are determined by the same standard. Almost all of the OWBPA
requirements are general in nature and could be applied to a waiver of an employment
discrimination claim. These requirements, therefore, could be read as a definition of 'knowing and
voluntary' and not necessarily only as a definition of 'knowing and voluntary' for ADEA claims.");
see also Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Downsizing and Employee Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 943,
1019-20 (1998) (arguing that the OWBPA's requirements for ADEA waivers should be used to
determine if waivers of non-ADEA claims, such as those under Title VII and the ADA, are
knowing and voluntary).
296. House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 24.
297. See id.
298. Id.
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discrimination was more difficult to detect.29 9
Indeed, courts have expressly rejected the argument for a uniform test,
recognizing that Congress did not intend the OWBPA's requirements to
be used to evaluate whether non-ADEA waivers were knowing and
voluntary. 3" Other courts have implicitly acknowledged this intent for
different tests, by using the OWBPA to evaluate a waiver of ADEA claims
but a non-OWBPA-based test (such as the totality test) to evaluate that
same waiver as to non-ADEA claims (such as Title VII, the ADA, or state
law employment claims). 30 1 Thus, use of a uniform OWBPA-based test has

299. Id. at 22. See also Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 32 (stating that "[giroup
termination and reduction programs stand in stark contrast to the individual
separation... [because] employees affected by these programs have little or no basis to suspect that
action is being taken based on their individual characteristics").
300. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Cole Taylor Bank, 152 F.3d 666,673 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that
"Ithere is no counterpart in Title VII land to the [OWBPA]" and viewing as "hardly plausible" the
notion that "the highly specific requirements of [the] OWBPA ... codify the general concept of
'knowing and voluntary"'); Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930,936-37 (5th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the OWBPA's requirements should be used to evaluate their
waivers of claims under the Workers Adjustment Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2109 (2000), which is a federal employment law requiring certain employers to provide
sixty days advance notice to employees in the event of "mass layoffs" or terminations, because
"their proffered analogy between WARN and the ADEA does not survive scrutiny. The
OWBPA... is a change from the common law, and there is no similar obligation imposed on
employers under WARN."); Capuano v. Brown, No. CV970339085, 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2087, at *5-7 (July 22, 1998) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the court should use the
OWBPA requirements to evaluate her waiver of Title VII and ADA claims, because "it was
Congress' intent to make the OWBPA criteria ... applicable only to claims brought under the
ADEA. The plaintiff has not brought such a claim, and so the court need not apply the specific
requirements of [the OWBPA] to the plaintiff's Title VII and ADA claims.").
301. See, e.g., Wastak v. Leigh Valley Health Network, 342 F.3d 281, 295 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting that "the statutory provisions of the OWBPA apply only to ADEA claims" and then finding
a waiver valid as to ADEA claims (because of compliance with the OWBPA) and also valid as to
Pennsylvania state employment claims under applicable state contract law); Tung v. Texaco, Inc.,
150 F.3d 206,208-09 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding a waiver invalid as to ADEA claims (because of noncompliance with the OWBPA) but valid as to Title VII claims under the totality test); Am. Airlines,
Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111, 118, 122 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding a waiver invalid as to
ADEA claims (because of non-compliance with the OWBPA) but remanding the case for a
determination of whether the waiver validly released a Puerto Rico employment discrimination
claim); Clark v. Buffalo Wire Works Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding a
waiver invalid as to ADEA claims (because of non-compliance with the OWBPA) but valid as to
state law employment claims pursuant to state law); see also Henkel, supra note 280, at 417-18
(recognizing that "where courts have found that waivers of ADEA claims are invalid under the
OWBPA, they have been willing to find releases effective as to non-ADEA claims"); Eileen
Silverstein, From Statute to Contract:The Law of the Employment RelationshipReconsidered,18
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 491 n.67 (2001) (noting that "[t]he majority of the courts

addressing the issue have taken the position that waivers of the right to litigate non-ADEA statutory
claims need not comply with the OWBPA requirements").
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neither congressional nor judicial backing. 0 2
While Congress did not intend all of the OWBPA's requirements to
apply to non-ADEA waivers, one could also argue that the Waiver
Certainty Test should nonetheless include more (or fewer) of those
OWBPA requirements. 0 3 The response to this argument requires a
breakdown of the OWBPA's requirements into two groups: (1) those that
Congress derived from the factors of the totality test and (2) those that
Congress newly and purposefully created as part of its more stringent
ADEA waiver protections for older workers.
Inclusion of the former group into a test for non-ADEA waivers is
warranted because Congress borrowed them from a non-ADEA waiver
test-the totality test. In enacting the OWBPA, Congress was aware of the
totality test and all of its factors; yet, it selected four-and only four-of
those factors for conversion into OWBPA waiver requirements. These
factors were (1) the clarity and unambiguity of the waiver language, (2)
the existence of valid consideration to support the waiver, (3) advising the
employee to consult with an attorney, and (4) affording adequate time to

302. Courts and commentators have recognized that use of two different tests (the OWBPA
for ADEA waivers and another test-such as the totality test-for non-ADEA waivers) results in
a "paradox" whereby the same waiver is invalid for ADEA claims but valid for other federal
employment claims. See Blackwell, 152 F.3d at 673 (noting that use of different tests "produces the
paradox that workers of age 40 and up who quit in response to a group offer receive more legal
protection than members of minority groups who quit in response to such offers"); Filippatos &
Farhang, supranote 240, at 314 (discussing Blackwell and arguing that "there is no justification for
the 'paradox' of limiting the rigorous protections found in the OWBPA to age claims"); Silverstein,
supra note 301, at 491 n.67 (noting that use of different tests "leads to the odd result that the same
waiver may be found 'voluntary and knowing' as to some claims of employment discrimination but
not others").
Indeed, because the Waiver Certainty Test is different than the OWBPA, this so-called
"paradox" would exist under this new test. But, this paradox does not undermine the Waiver
Certainty Test, because the only way to avoid the paradox among federal employment claims is to
do that which Congress did not intend-to use a uniform OWBPA-based test for both ADEA and
non-ADEA waivers.
While these "paradoxical" situations would still arise under the Waiver Certainty Test, there
would be fewer of them because this new test's waiver requirements (including the twenty-one day
review period and advising the employee to consult with an attorney) dovetail with-and, in fact,
mirror-four of the OWBPA's requirements. Thus, the Waiver Certainty Test would "solve" the
"paradoxes" that are caused by (1) the totality test validating a waiver that has a shorter review
period than the OWBPA's twenty-one days and (2) the totality test validating a waiver in which
the employer did not advise the employee to consult with an attorney before signature (as required
by the OWBPA).
303. Whether one would endorse more, or fewer, of the OWBPA's requirements for the
Waiver Certainty Test depends, of course, on one's perspective and preferences. For example, some
employers might want fewer of the OWBPA requirements in the new test, while some employees
may want more.
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the employee to review the waiver before signature. 30 4 The Waiver
Certainty Test embodies these congressional preferences because it
includes the same four requirements-no more and no less-that Congress
borrowed from the totality test.3 °5
In contrast, inclusion of additional requirements from the latter group
into a test for non-ADEA waivers is unwarranted because Congress
expressly created these new requirements to protect only older workers
and their ADEA waivers. The OWBPA requirements that fall into this
latter group are the following: (1) that the waiver specifically refer to
ADEA claims or rights; (2) that the employee does not waive any
prospective rights or claims; and (3) that the waiver agreement affords the
employee a seven-day period in which to revoke the agreement after
signing it.3° 6 None of these requirements was derived from any version of
the totality test. Rather, as discussed above, Congress adopted these new,
more stringent waiver requirements to protect older workers better because
of their greater susceptibility to ADEA waiver-related manipulation. The
Waiver Certainty Test for non-ADEA waivers is consistent with this
congressional intent and purpose, because it excludes each of these new
requirements that Congress uniquely tailored only for ADEA waivers and
older workers. °7

304. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000); supra Part IV.C.2.

305. One could argue that the OWBPA's requirement of referring specifically to ADEA rights
and claims in the waiver is, in fact, derived from or related to the totality test factor regarding a
clear, unambiguous waiver. However, circuit courts applying the totality test have not required that
level of specificity when evaluating the clarity factor under the totality test. See, e.g., Smith v.
Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434,443-44 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that "[tihere is no obligation... under
Title VII or federal common law, that a release must specify Title VII or federal causes of action
to constitute a valid release of a Title VII claim"); Williams, 23 F.3d at 935-37 (stating that "Itihere
is no obligation under WARN or the common law for [an employer] to mention WARN for the
release to be valid"); Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458,461 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating
that "an agreement need not specifically recite the particular claims waived in order to be
effective"). Consequently, this OWBPA requirement belongs in the latter group of newly created,
more stringent requirements, rather than in the former group of requirements that Congress derived
from the totality test.
306. Similarly, the additional requirements for ADEA waivers that are obtained in larger scale
terminations of a "group or class of employees"--namely, an expanded forty-five-day review
period and the informational requirements-also belong in the latter group of newly created, more
stringent requirements and are inappropriate to include in any non-ADEA waiver test (such as the
Waiver Certainty Test) for the same reasons discussed above. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(H).
307. Because the totality test does not specify the time period that must be afforded to an
employee to review a waiver, one could argue that the OWBPA's twenty-one day review period
was a new, more stringent requirement to protect older workers and that the Waiver Certainty
Test's review period should be less. While this argument has certain theoretical appeal, the practical
problem is ascertaining the time period that Congress used as its "reasonable starting point" before
expanding to a more stringent twenty-one day period. For example, the Senate OWBPA Report
does not discuss any "reasonable starting point" time frame; instead, it just explains that an
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C. The Waiver Certainty Test Avoids the Problems Created

by the Totality Test
Because the Waiver Certainty Test includes per se waiver requirements
that are within an employer's control, it avoids the four problematic
consequences that result from the totality test. As a result, this new test is
a better waiver approach for employers, employees, and the courts.
1. The Waiver Certainty Test Safeguards Good-Faith
Employers
The totality test and the Waiver Certainty Test treat differently goodfaith employers who take the necessary steps within their control to ensure
that an employee's waiver is knowing and voluntary. Under the former,
the Employee-Dependent Factors inject elements of uncertainty into that
determination for any waiver. As a result, even if an employer does
everything "right" in procuring the waiver, the Employee-Dependent
Factors nonetheless can undermine and overshadow those efforts and
allow the employee to create ajusticiable issue as to the waiver's validity.
The good-faith employer is then forced into costly litigation on that issue.
By contrast, the Waiver Certainty Test-like the OWBPAsafeguards employers who embrace their waiver-related responsibilities.
Because both tests set forth precise, black-and-white steps that employers
employee "needs time" to recover from the "shock" of losing a job, to evaluate any severance
benefits, and to consult with an attorney, and it then specifies the twenty-one day period. See Senate
OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 33.
Although one might try to extrapolate a lesser time period from the decisions that have applied
the totality test and found the review period to be sufficient, the courts themselves have recognized
that "[tihere is no bright-line test for determining what is a sufficient amount of time for an
employee to consider a release and consult with an attorney before the employee is considered to
have signed the release knowingly and voluntarily." Puentes v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 86 F.3d
196, 198-99 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (nonetheless concluding that "absent some reason for urgency,
twenty-four hours is too short a period"). Consequently, the extrapolated time period is likely to
be consistent with some jurisdictions but inconsistent with others.
In addition, even if one could identify a lesser time period that was still adequate, use of two
different review periods in the same waiver-a twenty-one day requirement for the ADEA waiver
and a shorter period (such as seven days) for the non-ADEA waiver-may lead to confusion among
employees as to how long they actually have to review the entire document. In an effort to avoid
that confusion, employers would likely find it necessary to use two different waiver agreements,
which itself could still confuse employees and which places additional administrative burdens on
employers.
Finally, the reality is that employees, even when afforded a twenty-one day review period
(under the OWBPA, for example), rarely take the entire period and usually accomplish their review,
and sign the waiver, within a shorter time period anyway. Thus, the Waiver Certainty Test's use
of a three-week period would likely result in little practical impact on employers who desire more
prompt closure of a severance matter.
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have the responsibility (and capability) of satisfying, they substitute the
definite for the uncertain on the knowing and voluntary issue. When an
employer meets its responsibilities under the Waiver Certainty Test (and
the OWBPA), those efforts cannot be minimized or eclipsed by actions
that the employee alone chooses to take or not take, or by characteristics
that the employee has or does not have. Instead, this good-faith employer
receives the assurance that the waiver is knowing and voluntary for federal
common law purposes. Even if the employee otherwise opts to mount a
challenge to the waiver under state common law contract principles (such
as duress, fraud, incapacity, or mutual mistake)," 8 the employer avoids the
litigation cost-related penalty of the totality test, because the employee
cannot attempt to use that test's inherent gray areas to force the employer
into litigation on the knowing and voluntary issue.
Thus, unlike the totality test, the Waiver Certainty Test does not hold
the good-faith, compliance-minded employer-such as United States Steel
in Coventry,3" Public Service Company in Torrez,31° or your company in
the example in Part I of this article-in a quasi-purgatory in which the
employer's fate is out of its hands and rests upon factors that were never
test places that
within its control from the beginning. Instead, this3 new
11
employer in a knowing and voluntary "safe harbor."

308. Because the knowing and voluntary issue and these state law contract requirements are
distinct, the Waiver Certainty Test would not displace the latter. Courts applying the totality test
have reached the same result, thereby allowing an employee to contest the knowing and voluntary
issue under the totality test but also to claim that the waiver was otherwise invalid under a state law
contract theory (such as duress or fraud). See, e.g., Cuchara v. Gai-Tronics Corp., No. 04-2268,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7885, at *4-11 (3d Cir. May 4, 2005) (evaluating separately the plaintiff's
knowing and voluntary argument under the totality test and his state law contract defense of
fraudulent inducement); Nicklin v. Henderson, 352 F.3d 1077, 1081 (6th Cir. 2003) (evaluating
separately the knowing and voluntary argument under the totality test and the contract defenses of
mistake and fraud); Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 443 (5th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing
between the knowing and voluntary argument under the totality test and state law defense
arguments of fraud or duress, but not evaluating the latter defenses because the plaintiff did not
assert them); Wagner v. Nutrasweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1996) (evaluating separately
a plaintiffs state law defense of lack of adequate consideration and her knowing and voluntary
argument under the totality test); Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562,56872 (7th Cir. 1995) (evaluating separately the plaintiff's "state contract law" arguments-which
included contractual ambiguity, duress, and fraudulent inducement-and the "federal civil rights
law" argument regarding knowing and voluntary waiver under the totality test; also stating that a
plaintiff's knowing and voluntary argument is "in addition to any other contentions the plaintiff
may or may not make, including challenges to the formation of the contract, such as offer,
acceptance or consideration, or other defenses, such as duress or fraud"); see also supra note 88
(discussing the Fifth Circuit's O'Hare opinion and why the knowing and voluntary
determination-and the totality test--do not displace the state contract law defense of duress).
309. See Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514,524 (3d Cir. 1988).
310. See Torrez v. Pub. Serv. Co., 908 F.2d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 1990).
311. See supra Part V.A.
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2. The Waiver Certainty Test Affords Concrete Protection
for Employees
In addition to safeguarding good-faith employers, the Waiver Certainty
Test better protects employees by affording them concrete, waiver-related
rights and by minimizing the likelihood that employers will act in badfaith when obtaining waivers. Under the totality test, courts weigh a pool
of factors or criteria and then compute a result from a net sum game of
arithmetic. 12 However, because "[n]one of the criteria are absolute
conditions for enforceability of the release, ' 31 3 employees do not receive
any tangible rights under the totality test. Realistically, these employees
depend upon their employers for any waiver-related protections.314 Yet, the
totality test's lack of requirements affords bad-faith employers the
opportunity (if not motivation) to provide protections that are "a series of
half measures"315 and thus play the net sum game to the detriment of
employees.
On the other hand, the Waiver Certainty Test provides per se waiver
protections and rights to employees.3" 6 Although the waiver clarity and
valid consideration protections parallel those that the employee likely
already has under traditional contract law, this new test's additional,
OWBPA-like protections (i.e., its mandated twenty-one day review period
and required, written advice to the employee to consult with an attorney)
extend far beyond any rights that are guaranteed to employees under
traditional contract law or the totality test. While the absence of either of
these additional criteria would not necessarily doom an employee's waiver
under the totality test, the Waiver Certainty Test automatically renders that
same waiver invalid and thus provides a heightened level of protection for
17
employees.

312. See supra Parts II.C, IV.A.
313. Filippatos & Farhang, supra note 240, at 305-06.
314. See id.
315. Id.
316. See supra Part V.A.
317. One could argue that, under certain circumstances, the Waiver Certainty Test's
definitiveness provides less protection to an employee than the totality test's uncertainty. For
example, suppose an employer terminates an employee because of his national origin. The
employer offers severance pay to the employee in exchange for a waiver of all federal employment
claims. The waiver is clearly worded, and it advises the employee that he has twenty-one days in
which to review it and that he should consult with an attorney before signing it. However, the
employee is illiterate, cannot read any part of the waiver, and does not have access to anyone who
can read. As a result, the employee signs the waiver immediately without consulting an attorney
or any other family member, friend, or advisor.
In that situation, a court applying the Waiver Certainty Test's four requirements would
conclude that this employee knowingly and voluntarily signed the waiver. In contrast, the totality
test would at least give the employee the opportunity to argue (whether successfully or not) that
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In addition to providing concrete protections to employees, the Waiver
Certainty Test also sends the right message to bad-faith employers: If you
do not comply with the test's waiver requirements, that waiver will not be
a bar to any federal employment claim. Unlike the totality test, this new
test does not "overlook[] [an employer's failure in one area] based upon
the employer's satisfaction" of another area.3"' As a result, the Waiver
Certainty Test eliminates the bad-faith employer's motivation to take halfmeasures and cut comers (i.e., giving a very short review period or not
advising the employee to consult with an attorney) just to try to "get one

certain Employee-Dependent Factors invalidated his waiver.
However, the employee's waiver would not be doomed in a court that applied the Waiver
Certainty Test, because that test would only foreclose a dispute on the knowing and voluntary issue.
The employee could still argue that the waiver was invalid under traditional state contract defenses,
such as incapacity or fraudulent inducement. See supra notes 88, 308 (observing that a test for the
knowing and voluntary determination does not displace other state contract law defenses).
In addition, even though one might criticize the Waiver Certainty Test because it does not
permit this employee to make the knowing and voluntary argument, the OWBPA forecloses the
same argument. Suppose that this employee was fifty years old, and the employer then satisfied the
OWBPA's requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of ADEA claims. Because the waiver
is OWBPA-compliant and thus knowing and voluntary, the employee would similarly have to rely
on the traditional state contract defenses to invalidate the waiver.
Ultimately, the key point may be that this employee's set of circumstances is extremely
unique-a typical employee is neither illiterate nor so isolated that he or she cannot find someone
with whom to discuss the matter. If a court designs a test around a unique set of circumstances in
order to achieve a just result in that case, then the test may create unforeseen consequences for the
vast majority of cases in which the circumstances are more typical. One commentator has stated
that:
[t]he literature is full of cases that resemble the following fact pattern: A court is
faced with a problem that arises in the employment context, but the only tool
available is contract law. The justice of the servant's cause is apparent, and the
case cries out for the court to solve the problem. However, existing contract law
does not solve this particular plaintiffs problem, so in order to make contract law
work, the court must bend or twist the law to fit the situation. The newly bent
doctrine saves this particular plaintiff in this particular case. Justice is done.
But... the new rule does a poor job of solving the problems of many other
employees in similar situations but with somewhat different facts.
Franklin G. Snyder, The Role of Contractin the Modern Employment Relationship:The Pernicious
Effect of Employment Relationshipson the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 48
(2003).
So, while the totality test may provide more flexibility for this unique set of circumstances, its
use for the typical waiver situations generates the problematic consequences discussed in Part I.B.
The Waiver Certainty Test eliminates these problematic consequences and, for the reasons set forth
in Part V.C, is better suited for protecting both employees and employers in the typical waiver
situations.
318. Filippatos & Farhang, supra note 240, at 305.
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by" the employee.
Of course, under the Waiver Certainty Test, a bad-faith employer might
still opt to not meet the new test's requirements. But, because the
consequences of that failure are black-and-white and economically
substantial, the bad-faith employer is much less likely to make that choice
under the Waiver Certainty Test. While the totality test can lead the badfaith employer to water, the Waiver Certainty Test creates a greater
likelihood of making him drink. As a result, the employee who works for
the bad-faith employer-especially the employee who would not have
sued that employer anyway-is much more likely to receive waiverrelated protections under this new test.
3. The Waiver Certainty Test Eases Court Dockets by Reducing
Waiver-Related Litigation
The Waiver Certainty Test is also beneficial to the judicial system by
reducing waiver-related lawsuits. Under the totality test, a court's
evaluation of the pool of knowing and voluntary factors is necessarily "a
fact-intensive exercise 319 performed in an "ad hoc fashion."'3 20 As
Congress recognized in opting for the clear-cut waiver approach in the
philosophy serves to "promis[e]
OWBPA, the totality test's case-by-case
321
future.,
the
in
litigation
more
On the other hand, the Waiver Certainty Test does for non-ADEA
waivers what the OWBPA did for ADEA waivers-it provides a set of
"clear and ascertainable standards... [that] clarif[ies] an unsettled area of
the law and reverse[s] a disturbing trend of litigation" regarding those
waivers."' Like the OWBPA, the Waiver Certainty Test provides blackand-white waiver requirements that employers either meet or do not
meet-there are no employee-dependent variables to create uncertainty.
Consequently, both employees and employers would know at a prelitigation stage whether or not the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and
they would be less likely to pursue an exploratory waiver challenge (if an
employee) or an unconvincing waiver defense (if an employer).
Of course, court dockets would still contain waiver-related disputes that
center on traditional contract law principles and defenses, such as duress,
fraud, or incapacity. However, because the Waiver Certainty Test clarifies
the law on the knowing and voluntary issue, courts would be less likely to
see, and thus have to devote their limited resources to, waiver-related cases

319.
320.
321.
322.

Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 1995).
Filippatos & Farhang, supra note 240, at 305.
House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 27, 51.
See id.; see also supra Part V.A.
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that often include that issue as the main legal dispute.323
4. The Waiver Certainty Test Would Not Reduce Severance
Benefits Provided in Exchange for Waivers
Finally, cost-conscious employers likely view waiver-related litigation
expenses as a discrete cost of a termination event. These expenses can be
significant under the totality test, because its Employee-Dependent Factors
inject uncertainty into waivers and can be used to force an employer to
litigate a waiver's validity. Under that test, these cost-conscious employers
are likely to reduce the amount of employee severance benefits in order to
offset the additional "cost" of the termination-the waiver-related
litigation expenses.
By contrast, severance benefits would be more stable under the Waiver
Certainty Test. Because this new test eliminates the uncertainty that
perpetuates waiver-related litigation under the totality test, a particular
employer will be subject to fewer lawsuits (if any at all) that challenge the
validity of a waiver. As a result, the cost-conscious employer will not view
waiver-related litigation expenses as a cost that needs to be offset from
employee severance benefits and-all other costs being the same-will
likely maintain the status quo.324
While the Waiver Certainty Test avoids these four problematic
consequences of the totality test, one could argue that, as many circuit
courts have concluded, the totality test's heightened scrutiny of waivers is
consistent with, and furthers, the "strong congressional purpose ... to
eradicate discrimination in employment. 3 25 While the circuits did not
323. Although the courts would likely see fewer knowing and voluntary cases as a result of
the Waiver Certainty Test, they could still see some waiver cases that dispute this issue. For
example, an employee could still contend under this new test that the waiver was not supported by
valid consideration or that the scope of the waiver is unclear due to ambiguous waiver language.
Nonetheless, current waiver-related litigation under the totality test typically revolves around the
test's Employee-Dependent Factors rather than the consideration and contract clarity factors. See
supra Part lI.C (discussing circuit court decisions applying the totality test). Because the Waiver
Certainty Test excludes these factors, it would reduce the frequency of legal challenges on the
knowing and voluntary issue.
324. If an employer had already built these waiver-related litigation expenses into its
severance benefits, then it could either (1) maintain the status quo for severance benefits or (2)
actually increase severance benefits under the theory that it no longer needs to offset for waiverrelated litigation expenses. The choice would depend upon the employer, but the important point
is that, under either choice, the employer does not reduce severance benefits by anticipated waiverrelated litigation expenses.
325. See, e.g., Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 571 (7th Cir.
1995); O'Hare v. Global Natural Res., Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1990); Bormann v.
AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Torrez v. Pub. Serv. Co., 908
F.2d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that the totality test better protects "the strong policy
concerns to eradicate discrimination in employment"); Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514,
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elaborate as to how the totality test accomplished this noble purpose, the
probable basis for the argument is that bad-faith employers will be more
likely to discriminate against employees if they know they can "get away
with it" by easily persuading a court that signed waivers (releasing
legitimate federal employment claims) are valid.
However, the circuits relied on this conclusion to justify their adoption
of the totality test over the pure contract-based approach.326 Presumably,
these courts viewed a contract-principles-only approach as providing badfaith employers with an "easier" route to waiver enforcement, which
would have allowed them to conceal their discriminatory conduct. But, this
article proposes a test that is different from the pure contract-based
approach.327 Thus, the issue is not whether the totality test is better than the
pure contract-based approach in furthering the national anti-discrimination
policies, but whether the Waiver Certainty Test furthers those policies at

522-23 (3d Cir. 1988) (same).
326. See Coventry, 856 F.2d at 522-23.
327. See supra Part V.A. Because only a modest minority of the federal circuits still utilize
the pure contract-based approach, this article has focused on (1) evaluating and critiquing the
totality test that is currently used by nine federal circuits and (2) proposing the Waiver Certainty
Test as the replacement for that totality test. However, because the knowing and voluntary standard
applies in all of the circuits, the proposed Waiver Certainty Test would also extend to the two
circuits that use the pure contract-based approach.
While an in-depth critique of this minority approach is beyond the scope of this article, this
approach is problematic for several reasons. First, while Alexander created an independent
"knowing and voluntary" waiver requirement, the pure contract-based approach does not
necessarily treat it as independent, because courts use the same contract principles (such as duress
or fraud) to evaluate that requirement as other contract-invalidating state law defenses. See, e.g.,
O'Shea v. Comm. Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1991) (relying on the principles of
contract clarity, duress, and fraud to evaluate the knowing and voluntary requirement). This
approach does not use a separately tailored inquiry for the knowing and voluntary requirement.
Second, because state contract principles can vary in form and application among the twelve
states within the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, the pure contract-based approach essentially amounts
to twelve different state law approaches for determining the knowing and voluntary issue. These
various states' contract laws would result in non-uniform application of the knowing and voluntary
standard in roughly one-quarter of the country.
Third, the pure contract-based approach-if it is too lenient and more easily validates
waivers-is more likely to keep the judicial system from adjudicating legitimate, underlying federal
employment claims (which are covered by the waivers). If bad-faith employers escape legitimate
federal employment claims under soft state contract law, then that state's law frustrates the antidiscrimination policies and protections of federal law. See O'Hare,898 F.2d at 1017 (stating that
"[tihe better rule is to fashion a federal common law to determine this [knowing and voluntary]
issue because the policies embedded in the federal statute should not be frustrated by state law").
Finally, like the totality test, the pure contract-based approach does not impose any per se
waiver rights (such as a review period) that serve to protect employees who are asked to sign
waivers. Indeed, this approach does not even go as far as the totality test, which forces courts to
evaluate a pool of factors as part of a unique, heightened inquiry into the knowing and voluntary
issue.
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least as much as the totality test.
In fact, when compared to the totality test, the Waiver Certainty Test
does a better job of promoting anti-discrimination policies. Unlike the
totality test, this new test affords four concrete waiver protections that are
designed to give employees ample time and opportunity to (1) identify
unlawful conduct and (2) take action based on that knowledge. Because
these protections include a three-week review period and the guarantee of
being advised in writing to consult an attorney before signing a waiver,
employees (and their attorneys) have a greater likelihood of spotting
discriminatory conduct by a bad-faith employer and then pursuing avenues
to hold that employer accountable (i.e., litigation or greater severance
benefits through negotiations).
Similarly, the OWBPA was designed to do a betterjob of furthering the
ADEA' s anti-discrimination policies.328 Openly critical of the totality test's
lack of "clear and ascertainable standards, 329 Congress opted for per se
waiver requirements (including a review period and advising the employee
to consult with an attorney) designed to protect older workers from
unsuspected age discrimination.330 Specifically, Congress viewed these
two waiver requirements as providing employees "time to learn about the
conditions of termination," "to locate and consult with an attorney," and
"to determine what legal fights may exist., 331 Just as the OWBPA was
better than the totality test in furthering the anti-age discrimination policies
of the ADEA, the Waiver Certainty Test-with its similar concrete waiver
protections-would also do a better job of furthering the antidiscrimination policies of the other federal employment laws.
VI. CONCLUSION

The totality test experienced a meteoric rise in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Today, a vast majority of the federal circuits embrace that test for
determining whether an employee's non-ADEA waiver meets the knowing
and voluntary standard. In adopting the totality test, these circuits
considered the two then-available choices-the totality test and the pure
contract-based approach. Because the former involved a heightened level
of scrutiny, it garnered the accolades and endorsements.
Despite the totality test's current popularity among the circuits, two of
its primary features-its lack of per se waiver requirements and its
inclusion of Employee-Dependent Factors-have spawned problematic

328.
329.
330.
note 169,
331.

See House OWBPA Report, supra note 169, at 2.
See id. at 27.
See Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 26, 32; House OWBPA Report, supra
at 22, 27.
Senate OWBPA Report, supra note 158, at 33.
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consequences for employees, employers, and the judicial system. These
features are also inconsistent with the congressional waiver approach
embodied in the OWBPA, which evidences neither a factor-based
approach nor employee-dependent variables.
Consequently, this Article proposes the Waiver Certainty Test as a
different, but better, choice for determining whether a federal employment
waiver is knowing and voluntary. This four-factor test offers a black and
white approach that better serves the interests of the three groups affected
by the knowing and voluntary issue. The Waiver Certainty Test is more
beneficial for: (1) employees, by affording concrete waiver protections and
rights (including a three week review period and the right to be advised in
writing to consult with an attorney) that the totality test omits; (2) goodfaith employers, by setting forth an OWBPA-like, do-it-yourself set of
waiver requirements that are within an employer's control; and (3) the
judicial system, by reducing the trend of often unsuccessful waiver-related
litigation caused by the uncertainties inherent in the totality test.
Like any shooting star, the totality test was bound to lose its luster.
That time has come, and the Waiver Certainty Test points the way to much
needed reform in the area of knowing and voluntary federal employment
waivers.
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